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Abstract!This' thesis' investigates' the' influence'of' social' comparison' (i.e.' comparing'ones'outcomes'with'others'such'as'neighbours,'colleagues,'etc)'on'consumption'and'riskJtaking.''The' first' essay' (joint' with' Robert' H.' Frank' and' Adam' S.' Levine)' shows' how'income'growth'of'the'top'ranks'of'the'income'distribution'can'decrease'overall'saving' rates' through' a' soJcalled' expenditure' cascade.' As' the' higher' incomes'increase' their' consumption,' those' ranked' below' them' also' increase' their'consumption' in' order' not' to' fall' behind' too'much,'which' causes' those' ranked'below' them' to' increase' consumption'as'well,' etc.'These' consumption' cascades'can' thus' lower' saving' rates' throughout' the' income' distribution.' We' provide'empirical'evidence'for'this'phenomenon'by'showing'that'several'proxies'related'to' financial' distress' (bankruptcy' rates,' divorce' rates,' commute' times)' are'positively'associated'with'increases'in'inequality.''The'second'essay'argues'shows'that'social'comparison'can'induce'riskJtaking.'It'shows' that' with' comparisonJconvex' preferences' social' comparison' would'induce'both'more'riskJtaking'and'a'preference'for'negatively'correlated'gambles.'With' a' laboratory' experiment' we' show' that' although' only' a' third' of' subjects'display'the'preference'for'negatively'correlated'outcomes'typical'of'comparisonJconvex'utility,'those'subjects'take'a'lot'more'risks'in'a'social'setting,'resulting'in'significantly' higher' overall' riskJtaking.' This' would' both' explain' the' puzzling'amount'of'portfolio'underJdiversification'among'households,'as'well'as'excessive'riskJtaking'among'financial'professionals'in'the'runJup'to'the'financial'crisis.''Finally,' the' third' essay' experimentally' investigates' whether' subjects' focus' on'rank' or' social' distance' when' comparing' their' outcomes.' In' the' theoretical'literature'both'specifications'have'been'used.'No'support'for'a'social'rank'effect'is'found,'but'a'higher'social'reference'point'is'found'to'be'positively'associated'with' more' risky' choices,' thus' lending' credibility' to' the' social' distance' utility'hypothesis.''' ''''
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Introduction''Keeping'up'with'the'Medici.'This'simple'phrase'sums'up'a'lot'of'what'this'thesis'is' about.' First' of' all,' and'maybe' the'most' obvious' connection,' this' thesis' was'mostly'written' in' the'splendid'renaissance'surroundings'of'Florence,' Italy,'and'the'standard'phrase'of' “keeping'up'with' the' jones’”' rings'hollow'here'as' there'are' not' that' many' Jones’' around' here' to' keep' up' with.' Rossi’s,' Bianchi’s,'Bartolini’s,'and'Manetti’s,'yes,'but'Jones’'not'so'much.'So'as'a'nod'to'the'amazing'four' years' that' I' spent' among' Florence’s' stupendous' palazzo’s' and' piazza’s' it'seems'fitting'to'name'the'thesis'after'it’s'most'prodigious'family.''Secondly' it' fits' in'with' the'message' of' the' first' chapter' of' this' thesis:' that' the'incomes,'lifestyles'and'expenditures'of'the'richest'members'of'society'can'have'an' important' trickleJdown'effect' on' the' rest' of' society.' In' Florence' the' artistic'output' that' emerged' as' other' families' tried' to' rival' the'Medici' in' conspicuous'displays'was'a'happy'byproduct'for'those'who'come'to'admire'the'city'today,'but'often' the' passions' aroused' by' social' competition' are' not' channeled' as'productively.' And' as' the' Pitti' family' can' attest:' trying' to' outdo' your' rivals' in'architectural'display'can'easily'result'in'financial'ruin.'''Finally,'the'Medici'were'a'family'of'bankers,'and'natural'riskJtakers,'which'fits'in'with' the' second' chapter' of' how' social' comparison' can' affect' risky' decisionJmaking.'Indeed'one'of'the'factors'that'lead'to'the'rise'of'the'Medici'is'the'collapse'of' the' Bardi,' Peruzzi' and' Acciaiuoli' banking' empires' as' a' result' of' all' three'families'taking'too'much'risk'with'large'sovereign'loans'in'a'bid'to'to'outdo'each'other.'''So'the'overall'theme'of'this'thesis'is'how'social'comparison'can'affect'decisionJmaking' in' the'economic'sphere.'Humans'are'social'animals'and'that'we'have'a'natural'tendency'to'compare'our'outcomes'is'obvious'to'anybody'that'has'ever'watched' siblings' fight' over' who'would' get' the' larger' piece' of' cake.' However,'most' of' standard' textbook' economics' does' not' take' this' social' dimension' into'account'and'models'economic'agents'as'solely'selfJconcerned'utilityJmaximizers.'





Relaxing'this'strong'assumption'and'investigating'the'consequences'is'what'this'thesis'sets'out'to'do.'''The' first' chapter' looks' at' how' social' comparison' could' affect' decisions' on'consumption'and'leisure,'and'especially'how'this'could'interact'with'rising'levels'of'inequality.'Even'when'we'only'compare'ourselves'with'those'who'are'similar'to'us,' this'would' still' imply' that' large' increases' in' consumption' in' the'highest'echelons'of'society'would'trickle'down'as'each'strata'of'society' increases'their'displays'of'consumption'in'order'to'keep'up'with'those'slightly'better'off.'''The'second'chapter' investigates'through'an'experiment'how'social'comparison'can'influence'riskJtaking'decisions.'This'turns'out'to'depend'a'lot'on'the'relative'strength' of' two' opposite' social' emotions:' envy' and' gloating.' Those'who' really'enjoy'outdoing'other' (as'opposed' to'mainly' fear'doing'worse' than'others),'are'the'most'likely'to'take'more'risk'when'being'able'to'compare'outcomes.'''Finally'the'third'chapter'tries'to'adjucate'whether'social'comparison'centers'mainly'on'rank'(i.e.'being'first'or'second,'no'matter'by'how'much),'or'on'the'size'of'the'difference'(i.e.'is'being'first'by'a'landslide'much'better'than'by'scraping'in''by'an'inch?).'Tentatively'it'seems'that'experimental'subjects'are'more'influenced'by'the'size'of'the'difference'instead'of'rank'per'se.''' '
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Prevailing* economic*models* of* consumer* behavior*
completely* ignore* the* well8documented* link*
between* context* and* evaluation.* *We* propose* and*
test* a* theory* that* explicitly* incorporates* this* link.**
Changes* in*one*group’s*spending*shift* the* frame*of*
reference* that* defines* consumption* standards* for*
others* just*below*them*on* the* income*scale,*giving*
rise* to* expenditure* cascades.* * Our* model,* a*
descendant*of* James*Duesenberry’s*relative* income*
hypothesis,* predicts* the* observed* ways* in* which*
individual*savings*rates*respond*to*changes*in*both*
own* and* others’* permanent* income,* as* well* as*
numerous* other* stylized* fact* patterns* that* are*
difficult*to*reconcile*with*prevailing*models.*





Introduction!Evaluative'judgments'are'known'to'depend'heavily'on'context.''For'example,'the'same'car'that'would'have'been'experienced'as'having'brisk'acceleration'in'1950'would' seem'sluggish' to'most'drivers' today.' ' Similarly,' a' house'of' given' size' is'more'likely'to'be'viewed'as'adequate'the'larger'it' is'relative'to'other'houses'in'the'same'local'environment.''And'an'effective'interview'suit'is'one'that'compares'favorably'with'those'worn'by'other'applicants'for'the'same'job.''Although' the' link' between' context' and' evaluation' is' uncontroversial' among'behavioral' scientists,' the' reigning' economic' models' of' consumer' behavior'completely' ignore' it.' ' These' models' assume' that' each' person’s' consumption'spending'is'completely'independent'of'the'spending'of'others.''''In' contrast,' James'Duesenberry’s' relative' income' hypothesis—once' a' staple' in'economics' textbooks—explicitly' acknowledged' the' link' between' context' and'evaluation.1'' In' this' paper' we' employ' a' variant' of' his' model' to' explore' the'relationship' between' context' and' spending' patterns.' ' In' this' effort,'we' exploit'data' that' allow' us' to' quantify' the' effects' of' substantial' increases' in' income'inequality'that'have'occurred'in'recent'decades.''According'to'the'lifeJcycle'and'permanent' income' hypotheses,' these' increases' should' have' no' effect' on'individual' spending' decisions.' ' In' contrast,' the' relative' income' hypothesis'predicts'a'substantial'change'in'spending'patterns'in'response'to'these'changes.'''From' statistical' analysis' of' U.S.' Census' data' for' the' 50' states' and' 100' most'populous' counties,' we' find' evidence' that' rapid' income' growth' concentrated'among' top' earners' in' recent' decades' has' stimulated' a' cascade' of' additional'expenditure'by'those'with'lower'earnings.''
1.!Expenditure!Cascades!Milton' Friedman’s' permanent' income' hypothesis' continues' to' provide' the'foundation' that'underlies'modern'economic' analysis' of' spending' and' savings.2''According'to'this'model,'a'family'spends'a'constant'proportion'of'its'permanent'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
1 Duesenberry, 1949. 
2 Friedman, 1957. 





income,' rich' or' poor.' ' The' model' thus' predicts' that' savings' rates' should' be'independent'of'household'income'and'should'remain'stable'over'time.''''Both' predictions' are' at' odds' with' experience.' ' It' has' long' been' shown,' for'example,'that'savings'rates'rise'sharply'with'permanent'income'in'crossJsection'data. 3 '' ' ' Savings' rates' have' also' shown' substantial' variation' over' time.'''According' to' U.S.' Department' of' Commerce' estimates' shown' in' Figure' 1,' the'aggregate'personal'savings'rate'has'fallen'from'an'average'of'roughly'10'percent'in' the'midJ1970s' to' below' zero' in' the' years' immediately' before' the' economic'downturn'of'2008.''
Figure!1.!!The!Personal!Savings!Rate!in!the!United!States!
'
Source:*Federal*Reserve*Bank*of*St.*Louis*'The'recent'experience'of'middleJincome'families'also'casts'doubt'on'Friedman’s'portrayal'of'the'relationship'between'household'income'and'spending.''In'1980,'the' median' size' of' a' newly' constructed' house' in' the' United' States' was'approximately' 1,600' square' feet.' By' 2001,' however,' the' corresponding' figure'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
3 See, for example, Mayer, 1972.  Mayer rejects Friedman’s original conjecture that this pattern is 
explained by the unresponsiveness of spending to transitory income changes, arguing that it cannot 
explain why people in high-income occupations save at higher rates than people in low-income 
occupations. 





had' grown' to' over' 2,100' square' feet—more' than' twice' the' corresponding'growth' in' median' family' earnings. 4 '' During' the' same' period,' the' median'household' experienced' substantial' growth' in' consumer' debt.' ' One' in' five'American'households'currently'has'zero'or'negative'net'worth.5''Why'has'consumption'expenditure'grown'so'much'more'rapidly'than'predicted'by' traditional' economic' models?' ' We' use' the' term' expenditure* cascade' to'describe'a'process'whereby'increased'expenditure'by'some'people'leads'others'just' below' them' on' the' income' scale' to' spend' more' as' well,' in' turn' leading'others'just'below'the'second'group'to'spend'more,'and'so'on.''Our'expenditure'cascade'hypothesis' is' that' a'pervasive'pattern'of' growing' income' inequality' in'the'United'States'has'led'to'the'observed'decline'in'savings'rates.''
2.!An!Illustrative!Model!Consider' an' economy' with' N' consumers' arranged' in' ascending' order' with'respect' to' their' permanent' incomes.' ' According' to' the' permanent' income'hypothesis,' individual' i’s' current' consumption,' ci,' is' proportional' to' his'permanent'income,'Yi:''' '
€ 
ci = γYi,i =1,...,N ,' ' ' ' ' (1)''where'
€ 




= 0,∀i ≠ j .' ' ' ' ' (2)'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''4'Median'house'size'growth:'http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/construct.pdf;'http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/f03.html.''Income'growth'rates:'Center'on'Budget'and'Policy'Priorities,'2003.!
 
5 Wolff, 2002. 





Thus,'according'to'the'permanent'income'hypothesis,'changes'in'the'distribution'of' income' should' have' no' effect' on' individual' spending' levels.' ' If' someone’s'income'does'not'change,'her'spending'will'remain'the'same,'even'if'the'income'and'spending'levels'of'others'change'substantially.''A'simple'version'of'the'baseline'model,'and'the'one'we'build'on'in'this'paper,'is'to' assume' that' individuals' have' preferences' over' current' consumption' and'future'consumption'and'can'transfer'consumption'from'the'present'to'the'future'by' saving' and' borrowing' decisions.' Let' utility' be' increasing' and' concave' in'consumption,'and' future'consumption'discounted'by'a' factor'
€ 
β∈ (0,1) ,' then' the'objective'function'that'an'individual'maximizes'is'given'by:''
€ 
U(c1,c2) = u(c1) + βu(c2) ,' ' ' ' ' (3)'' 'In' contrast' to' this' baseline' model,' we' consider' the' following' model' in' which'others’' consumption'does'play'a' role.6'Suppose'each' individual' i' compares'her'consumption' to' the' consumption' levels' of' a' set' of' neighbors' N(i).' We' let'
€ 
ˆ c = 1| N(i) | c jj∈N (i)
∑ 'represent' the' average' consumption' level' of' the' people' in' this'set.' We' further' assume' that' the' consumption' of' others' presents' a' negative'externality' and' thus' enters'negatively' into' the'utility' function.' The' strength'of'this'negative'externality'is'given'by'parameters'
€ 
α1,α2 ∈ (0,1) .''
€ 








u(c1−α1ˆ c) + βu(c2 −α2 ˆ c)
s.t.
c1+ s = y1
c2 = sR + y2
' ' ' (5)'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
6 This setup borrows on the asset trading model of Ghiglino and Goyal, 2010. 





'After'writing'down' the'Lagrangian' for' this'problem,'we' find' the' intertemporal'first'order'condition,'called'the'Euler'equation:''
€ 
u'(c1−α1ˆ c) = βRu'(c2 −α2 ˆ c)'' ' ' (6)''We' define' lifetime' income' by'
€ 
Y = Ry1+ y2 'and' rewrite' second' period'consumption' as'
€ 
c2 =Y − Rc1 .' We' then' proceed' by' total' differentiating' and'rearranging'equation'(6)'and'find'that7:''
€ 
dc1
d ˆ c =
α1u' '(c1−α1ˆ c) −α2βRu' '(c2 −α2 ˆ c)











c1 = 11+ β1/σR1/σ Y +
α1β
1/σR1/σ −α2
1+ β1/σR1/σ ˆ c '' ' (8)''The' first' part' of' this' equation' corresponds' to' the' standard'Permanent' Income'Hypothesis:' when' relative' consumption' does' not' play' a' role' (i.e.'
€ 
α1 = α2 = 0),'consumption' in' period' 1' is' a' constant' fraction' of' permanent' income' Y,'depending'only'on' the' real' interest' rate' and' the'discount' rate.'However'when'relative' consumption' does' play' a' role,' and' an' individual' is' sufficiently'myopic'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
7 Applying the fact that lifetime income is independent of the reference income, thus 
€ 
dY
d ˆ c = 0 . 









β1/σR1/σ ),' then' present'consumption'is'increasing'in'the'average'consumption'of'the'reference'group'
€ 











C1 = (I −γ 2GN )−1γ1Y ' ' ' ' (9)''The' matrix' GN' is' the' adjacency' matrix' where' entry'
€ 
Gi, jN 'is' equal' to'
€ 
1
|N(i) | 'if'individual' j' is' in' the' reference' group' of' individual' i.' The' inverse' matrix'
€ 
(I −γ 2GN )−1is'known'as'the'Bonacich'centrality'measure.'The'Bonacich'centrality'of'a'node'in'a'network'is'the'number'of'paths'through'the'network'that'end'on'that'node,'discounted'for'the'length'of'the'path.''Now' we' are' ready' to' go' back' to' our' economy' N' consumers' arranged' in'ascending'order'with'respect'to'their'permanent' incomes.'Let'the'first'entry' in'the'permanent'income'vector'Y'be'the'income'of'the'consumer'on'the'bottom'of'the' income' ladder,' and' the' last' entry' that' of' the' consumer' at' the' top' of' the'income'ladder.'Now'assume'that'each'consumer'acts'as'the'reference'group'for'the'consumer' just'below'her'on' the' income' ladder.' In'a' crude'way,' this'model'





captures' what' are' perhaps' the' two' most' robust' findings' from' the' behavioral'literature' on' demonstration' effects:' ' 1)' the' comparisons' that'matter'most' are'highly'localized'in'time'and'space;'and'2)'people'generally'look'to'others'above'them'on'the'income'scale'rather'than'to'those'below.8'''' 'When'we'examine'the'Bonacich'matrix'
€ 
(I −γ 2GN )−1 'of'such'a'network'we'find'an'upper' triangular' matrix' with' all' ones' on' the' diagonal,' all' zeros' below' the'diagonal'and'all'entries'positive'and'less'than'one'above'the'diagonal.'What'this'means'is'that'the'consumption'decision'by'a'consumer'is'affected'by'the'incomes'of' all' those' above'her' on' the' income' ladder.' The' top' consumer’s' consumption'decision' affect' the' decision' by' the' person' just' below,' whose' increased'consumption' affects' the' person' just' below' her,' etc.' It' is' through' such' an'expenditure' cascade'of' consumption'adjustments' that' increased' inequality' can'lower'the'overall'saving'rate.'' 'To' showcase' the' effects' increasing' inequality' can' lower' saving' rates' through'such'an'expenditure'cascade,'we'run'a'simple'but'demonstrative'simulation.'Our'economy' is' populated' by' 10' consumers,' ranked' from' 1' to' 10,' with' each'consumer'acting'as'the'reference'group'for'the'consumer'below'on'the' income'ladder.' For' our' simulations,' we' assume' parameter' values'
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α1 = 0.1,' and
€ 
α2 = 0.05.'We' increase' inequality' from' period' 1' to' period'10,' such' that' the' income' of' a' consumer' with' rank' r' at' time' t' is' given' by
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8 For a survey of the relevant literature, see Frank, 1985, chapter 2. 


























9 Dynan et al, 2004. 






'' 'Some'economists'may'object'that'concerns'about'relative'consumption'can'affect'savings'rates'in'the'manner'described'only'if'consumers'are'myopic.''After'all,'if'a'consumer'is'induced'to'spend'more'today'because'of'higher'current'spending'by'others,'she'will'have'even'lower'relative'consumption'in'the'future.'''Perhaps'so.' ' Yet' it' may' still' be' rational' to' be' responsive' to' community' consumption'standards.''''Consider,' for'example,' the'fact' that' in'most'communities,' the'median'family'on'the' earnings' scale' now' pays' much' more' for' housing,' in' real' terms,' than' its'counterpart'in'1980.''This'family'would'find'it'easier'to'live'within'its'means'if'it'simply' spent' less' on' housing' than' others' in' the' same' income' bracket.' ' But'because'the'quality'of'public'schools'in'the'United'States'is'closely'linked'to'local'property' taxes,' which' in' turn' depend' on' local' real' estate' prices,' this' family'





would'then'end'up'having'to'send'its'children'to'belowJaverage'schools.10''In'the'same' vein,' a' job' seeker' could' live' more' comfortably' for' the' time' being' by'refusing' to'match' the' increased'expenditures'of'others'on' interview'suits.' 'Yet'doing'so'would'entail'a'reduced'likelihood'of' landing'the'best' job'for'which'he'was'qualified.''It'is'thus'clear'that'being'influenced'by'community'consumption'standards'need'not'imply'myopia.'On'the'contrary,'it'may'be'a'perfectly'rational'response'on'the'part'of'consumers'in'pursuit'of'widely'recognized'goals.''On'the'other'hand,'there'is'considerable'evidence'that'myopia'is'a'salient'feature'of' human' psychology.11'' The' pain' of' enduring' lower' relative' living' standards'today' can' be' experienced' directly.' ' In' contrast,' the' pain' of' enduring' lower'relative' standards' in' the' future' can' only' be' imagined.' ' So' even' though'expenditure'cascades'can'exist' in' the'absence'of'myopia,' they'are'undoubtedly'strengthened'by'it.''In'any'event,'if'individual'spending'is'influenced'by'the'spending'of'others'in'the'manner'assumed'in'our'simple'model,'an'increase'in'income'inequality'will'give'rise' to' a' reduction' in' savings' rates.' ' In' the' next' section'we' examine' how' the'increase' in' inequality' assumed' in' our' illustration' compares' with' the' actual'recent'growth'in'inequality.''
3.!Changing!Patterns!of!Income!Growth!In'the'United'States,'income'growth'from'1945'until'the'end'of'1970s'was'wellJdescribed'by'the'famous'picket'fence'chart'shown'in'Figure'3.''Incomes'grew'at'about'the'same'rate'for'all'income'classes'during'that'period,'a'little'under'three'percent'per'year.'''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
10 In light of evidence that any given student’s achievement level rises with the average socio-economic 
status of his or her classmates, property values and school quality will be positively linked even in 
jurisdictions in which school budgets are largely independent of local property values. 
11 Pigou, 1929, and more recently, Ainslie, 1992; Laibson, 1998; and O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999. 









































Figure!6.!Changes!in!BeforeFtax!Incomes,!1979F2003.!http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/h03ar.html''''Income' inequality' has' also' increased' in' two' important' ways' not' portrayed' in'Figures' 3' and' 4.' ' One' is' that' changes' in' the' incomeJtax' structure' during' the'Ronald'Reagan'presidency' significantly' shifted' real' afterJtax'purchasing'power'in' favor' of' those' atop' the' economic' ladder,' a' change' that' was' reinforced' by'additional'tax'cuts'targeted'toward'highJincome'families'during'the'first'term'of'
























Figure!7.!!Change!in!AfterFTax!Household!Income,!1979F2000!Source:'Center'on'Budget'and'Policy'Priorities,'“The'New,'Definitive'CBO'Data'on'Income'and'Tax'Trends,”'Sept.'23,'2003!'For' present' purposes,' an' important' feature' of' recent' experience' is' that' the'aggregate' pattern' of' income' changes' repeats' itself' in' virtually' every' income'subgroup.' ' Thus,' if' we' look' at' the' top' quintile' of' the' earnings' distribution,'





earnings'growth'has'been'relatively'small'near'the'bottom'of'that'group'and'only'slightly'larger'in'the'middle,'but'much'larger'among'the'top'one'percent.''We'see'the'same'pattern'again'among'the'top'one'percent.''In'this'group,'the'lion’s'share'of'income'gains'have'accrued'to'the'top'tenth'of'one'percent.''Only' fragmentary'data'exist' for'people' that'high'up' in' the' income'distribution.''But'a'few'snapshots'are'available.''For'more'than'25'years,'for'example,'Business*
Week'has'conducted'an'annual'survey'of'the'earnings'of'CEOs'of'the'largest'U.S.'corporations.''In'1980,'these'executives'earned'42'times'as'much'as'the'average'American'worker,'a'ratio'that'is'larger'than'the'corresponding'ratios'in'countries'like' Japan' and' Germany' even' today.' ' But' by' 2001,' the' American' CEOs' were'earning'531'times'the'average'worker’s'salary.''There'is'evidence'that'the'gains'have'been'even'more'pronounced'for'those'who'stand'higher'than'CEOs'on'the'income'ladder.12''''A' similar' pattern' of' inequality' growth' is' observed' when' we' look' within'occupations' and' educational' groups.' ' It' shows' up,' for' example,' among' college'graduates,'dentists,'real'estate'agents'and'high'school'graduates.13''The*upshot*is*
that* almost* irrespective* of* the* identities* of* the* members* of* a* person’s* personal*
reference* group,* income* inequality* within* that* group* is* likely* to* have* grown*
sharply* in* recent*decades.' ' Even' for' the'wealthiest' reference' groups,' for'which'average'incomes'have'risen'most'sharply,'most'members'are'thus'likely'to'have'seen'their'incomes'decline'relative'to'those'of'their'most'prosperous'associates.''
4.!Three!Specific!Hypotheses!In' its' simplest' form,' the' expenditure' cascade' hypothesis' is' that' increasing'income'inequality'within'any'reference'group'leads'to'a'reduction'in'the'average'savings'rate'for'that'group.''Our'attempts'to'test'this'hypothesis'are'grounded'on'the'observation'that' income'growth'patterns' for'most'population'subgroups' in'the' United' States' in' recent' decades' are' roughly' like' the' one' shown' for' the'population'as'a'whole' in'Figure'5.' 'Within'most'groups,'people'at' the'top'have'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
12 See, for example, Krugman, 2002. As Wolff, 2002, has shown, the distribution of household net 
worth has also become more right-skewed in recent decades.  
13 See Frank and Cook, 1995, chapter 5. 





enjoyed' robust' earnings' growth,' while' others' have' seen' their' incomes' grow'much'more'slowly.''Our'claim'is'that'the'new'context'created'by'higher'spending'at' the' top'of' each' group'has' caused'others'within' the' group' to' save' a' smaller'proportion'of'their'incomes.''An'ideal'test'of'this'claim'would'examine'how'an'individual’s'spending'responds'when'other'members'of'his'or'her'personal'reference'group'alter'their'spending.''But' because' we' cannot' identify' the' specific' persons' who' constitute' any'individual’s'personal'reference'group,'we'are'forced'to'rely'on'crude'proxies.''''We'begin'by' assuming' that' the' amount'of' income' inequality'within' a'person’s'personal' reference' group' varies' directly' with' the' amount' of' inequality' in' the'geographic' area' in' which' that' group' is' embedded.' ' This' assumption' is' more'palatable'for'narrowly'defined'geographic'areas'than'for'broad'ones.' 'Thus,' for'example,'the'withinJreferenceJgroup'level'of'inequality'for'an'individual'is'likely'to' correspond'more' closely' to' the' degree' of' inequality' in' the' city' in'which' he'lives'than'to'the'degree'of'inequality'in'his'home'country.''In'one'version'of'our'study,' we' employ' samples' of' persons' segregated' by' state' of' residence.' In'another,'we'employ'samples'from'the'100'most'densely'populated'counties.''Our'inequality'measures'for'both'sets'of'jurisdictions'come'from'the'1990'and'2000'installments'of'the'United'States'Census.''Do' people' who' live' in' highJinequality' jurisdictions' in' fact' save' at' lower' rates'than' those' who' live' in' lowJinequality' jurisdictions?' Unfortunately,' the' Census'does'not'record'information'that'would'enable'us'to'construct'reliable'estimates'of'household'savings'rates'by'state'or'county.14''We'are'thus'forced'to'examine'alternative' restatements' of' the' hypothesis' that' are' amenable' to' testing' with'available'data.''''A' more' general' statement' of' the' hypothesis' is' that' families' living' in' highJinequality' areas' will' find' it' harder' to' live' within' their' means' than' their'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
14 We also looked into other data sources, such as the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Unfortunately we 
were unable to locate any savings rate data at a geographic level that made sense for our theory. 





counterparts' in' lowJinequality' areas.' ' This' observation' suggests' that' the'expenditure' cascade' hypothesis' can' be' tested' by' examining' the' relationships'between' various' measures' of' financial' distress' and' measures' of' income'inequality.''''Families'respond'to'financial'distress'in'multiple'ways,'some'of'which'leave'clear'footprints'in'data'available'from'the'Census'or'other'sources.''Beyond'saving'at'lower' rates,' for' example,' they' tend' to' carry' higher' levels' of' consumer' debt,'which' increases' their' likelihood' of' filing' for' bankruptcy.' ' In' addition,' families'who' cannot' afford' to' carry' the'mortgage'payments' for' houses' in' conveniently'located'neighborhoods'with'good'schools'often'respond'by'moving' to'cheaper,'more'remote'neighborhoods,'thus'increasing'their'average'commute'times.'''And'like'other'forms'of'distress,'financial'distress'may'increase'the'level'of'stress'in'personal' relationships,' thus' increasing' the' likelihood' of' marriages' ending' in'divorce.''We'have'found'that'for'both'state'and'county'data,'growth'in'inequality'between'1990'and'2000'is'positively' linked'with'growth'in'each'of'these'three'measures'of' financial' distress.'But'because' the'narrower' county' level'data' are'preferable'from'the'perspective'of'our'theory,'we'report'only'the'results'of'our'analyses'of'those'data.''Our'decision'to'focus'on'the'most'populous'counties'was'driven' in' part' by'Thorstein'Veblen’s' observation' that' “…consumption' claims' a'relatively'larger'portion'of'the'income'of'the'urban'than'of'the'rural'population…'[because]' the' serviceability' of' consumption' as' a' means' of' repute' is' at' its'best…where'the'human'contact'of'the'individual'is'widest'and'the'mobility'of'the'population'is'greatest.”15'''
5.!Empirical!Results!In' this' section,'we'present' the' results' of' empirical' studies' of' the' link'between'inequality'and'the'likelihood'of'filing'for'bankruptcy,'between'inequality'and'the'likelihood'of'filing'for'divorce,'and'between'inequality'and'commute'times.''We' calculated' two'measures' of' income' inequality' in' household' incomes.' ' The'first' was' the' ratio' of' the' 90th' percentile' household' income' to' 50th' percentile'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
15 Veblen, 1899, p. 66. 





household' income' (P9050).16'' The' second' is' the' Gini' coefficient,' a' number'between' zero' and' one' that' indicates' the' level' of' inequality' across' the' entire'income'distribution'of'an'area.17''For'present'purposes,'the'Gini'coefficient'is'the'preferred'inequality'measure,'because'it'is'Lorenz'consistent18'and'accounts'for'the' real' income' loss' experienced' by' those' in' the' lower' reaches' of' the' income'distribution' between' 1990' and' 2000,' the' specific' time' frame' covered' by' our'data.' ' In' the' results' we' report' below,' we' thus' confine' our' attention' to'regressions' in'which'our' inequality'measure'was'based'on' the'Gini' coefficient.''(Results'for'regressions'using'the'P9050'measures'were'qualitatively'similar.)''To'control' for'unobserved'heterogeneity'across' states'and'counties,'we' ran'all'our' regressions' in' firstJdifference' form.' In' our' bankruptcy' regressions,' for'example,' the' value' of' the' dependent' variable' for' each' area' is' the' difference'between' that' area’s' bankruptcy' filings' in'2000'and' the' corresponding'number'for' 1990.' ' Similarly,' the' area' inequality' variable' we' used' was' the' difference'between' its'Gini' coefficient' in'2000'and' the' corresponding'measure' in'1990.19''Because'both'years'were'at'approximately'the'same'point'in'the'business'cycle,'we'do'not'expect'this'external'influence'to'bias'our'results.''Our'firstJdifference'regression'models'thus'take'the'following'general'form:''
Δdepi'='a'+'bΔineqi'+'cΔxi'+'Δui','' ' ' ' '''''''''''''(6)'''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
16 P9050 ratios for states were calculated using 1-percent microdata samples provided by the Decennial 
U.S. Census.  The ratios for counties were estimated using income brackets.  For 1990, these brackets 
came from 1990 Census Summary File 3, tables P80 and P80A.  For 2000, see 2000 Census Summary 
File 3, tables P52 and P53.  
17 We used a program provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to calculate Gini coefficients. 
18 An inequality measure is Lorenz consistent if and only if it is simultaneously consistent with the 
anonymity principle (permutations among people do not matter for inequality judgments), population 
principle (cloning the entire population and their incomes does not alter inequality), relative income 
principle (only relative, and not absolute, income matters), and Dalton principle (regressive transfers 
from poor to rich increase inequality). 
19 Some Decennial Census data, such as income, are for the year prior to the year of the census.  In 
order to match income data with financial distress, we use non-business bankruptcies for 1989 and 
1999.  Welfare data used in the divorce rate regressions are from 1990 and 2000. 






Δineqi' =' ineq2000Jineq1990,' the' change' in' the' Gini' coefficient' for' area' i,'Δxi' is' a'vector'of' the'corresponding'changes' in'other'possible'exogenous' influences'on'the'dependent'variable'(with'c'its'vector'of'response'coefficients),'and'Δui'is'an'error' term,' assumed' i.i.d. 20 '' The' list' of' exogenous' variables' is' recorded'separately'for'each'regression.'
! !
5.1!Bankruptcy!Individuals' and' married' couples' may' file' for' nonJbusiness' bankruptcy' under'Chapters'7,'11,'or'13.21''To'assess'whether' increases' in' inequality' increase' the'likelihood'of'such'filings,'we'use'the'total'number'of'nonJbusiness'bankruptcies'under' any'of' these' three' chapters' as' the'basis' for' constructing'our'dependent'variable.22''''In'addition'to'DGini,'exogenous'variables'for'our'bankruptcy'regressions'include'a'mix'of'economic'and'socioJdemographic'characteristics'employed'by'authors'in'the'bankruptcy'literature,'all'translated'into'firstJdifference'form.23''Economic'factors' include' the' change' in' the' twentieth' percentile' household’s' nominal'income'(DNomP20),24'the'change'in'the'proportion'of'total'households'in'which'both' husband' and' wife' work' (DTwoWorker),' and' the' change' in' the'unemployment'rate'(DUnemploy).'SocioJdemographic'characteristics'include'the'change' in' average' household' size' (DHHsize),' the' change' in' the' proportion' of'total'population'black'(DBlack),'the'change'in'the'proportion'of'total'population'Asian' and' Pacific' Islander' (DAsian),' the' change' in' the' proportion' of' total'population' ages' 18J29' (DAge1829),' and' the' change' in' the' proportion' of' total'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
20 To test for heteroskedasticity, we used a special form of White’s test that regresses the squared 
residuals of the original regression on the predicted values and the squares of the predicted values.  We 
reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity if the F-test on the two independent variables is 
significant.  Instead of reporting the results of this test in every regression, homoskedasticity is 
assumed unless otherwise stated. 
21 The majority of cases were filed under Chapter 7 during the time period of our data. Only a handful 
of individuals and married couples filed in a different way. 
22 All bankruptcy data come from the American Bankruptcy Institute website 
<http://www.abiworld.org/stats/stats.html>. 
23 See, for example, White 2007; Fay et al., 2002; Summers and Carroll, 1987; and Hermann, 1966. 
24 Lacking price index data at the county level, we were forced to use nominal income.  But since the 
1990s was a period of relatively low inflation, the change in nominal income for a county ought to be a 
good approximation for the corresponding change in real income. 





population'ages'15'and'older'divorced'(DDivorce).''In'addition,'since'the'number'of'people'filing'for'bankruptcy'in'a'county'is'populationJsensitive,'we'include'the'change' in' the' total' county' population' aged' 18' and' over' as' an' independent'variable' (DAdultPopulation).' ' Finally,'we' include' the' change' in' population' per'square' mile' (DDensity).' ' Only' the' last' of' these' variables,' DDensity,' does' not'appear'in'standard'bankruptcy'studies.''We'added'it'to'control'for'the'possibility'that'it'might'be'correlated'with'social'forces'that'influence'the'likelihood'of'filing'for'bankruptcy.25''At' the' outset,' we' had' no' prior' views' about' what' functional' form' would' best'capture' the' relationship' between' income' inequality' and' financial' distress.''Simple' linear' regressions' of' the' change' in' nonJbusiness' bankruptcies' on' the'change'in'income'inequality'revealed'a'positive,'significant'relationship'in'both'our' state' and' most' populous' county' samples.' ' But' the' goodness' of' fit' was'generally' better' in' regressions' involving' the' logarithms' of' the' changes' in'bankruptcy'and'inequality'measures.' 'Also,' this'specification'was'robust'across'our'state'and'county'samples'and'facilitated'easilyJinterpretable'results'in'terms'of'elasticities.''In'Table'1,'we'report'the'results'for'the'ΔlnGini'measures'for'the'100'most'populous'counties.'' ''The' coefficient' for' ΔlnGini' suggests' that,' as' hypothesized,' changes' in' income'inequality'are'positively'and'significantly'associated'with'changes'in'the'number'of' nonJbusiness' bankruptcy' filings' in' our' sample' of' the' 100' most' populous'counties.''A'one'percent'increase'in'the'Gini'coefficient'is'associated'with'an'8.73'percent'rise' in'the'number'of'nonJbusiness'bankruptcies.' 'This' is'a'remarkably'strong' effect.' ' For' our' sample' of' the' 100' most' populous' counties,' the' Gini'coefficients' increased' by' an' average' of' 4.41' percent' between' 1990' and' 2000.''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
25 We do not expect legislation to skew the results, because most bankruptcy law occurs at the federal 
level, and there was no major change to federal bankruptcy law over the time period of our data (the 
most recent large-scale changes occurred in 1978 and 2005). One notable exception concerns what 
property may be considered exempt. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress adopted a 
uniform federal bankruptcy exemption but allowed the states the option of setting their own exemption 
levels. By the time our dataset began, all states had taken this option, though some have allowed filers 
the option to choose either the federal or state exemption level. As noted by Fay et al. 2002, states only 
rarely change their exemption levels, and most changes are designed to simply preserve the real values 
of these levels. 





Our' estimate' thus' implies' that' increased' inequality' in' these' counties' was'associated' with' an' almost' 40' percent' increase' in' bankruptcy' filings' between'1990' and' 2000.' ' This' estimate' seems' reasonable' given' that,' on' average,' nonJbusiness'bankruptcies'increased'148'percent'in'our'sample.'''













Dependent* Variable:* Change* in* the* natural* logarithm* of* the* number* of* non8
business*bankruptcies.*Sample:*100*Most*Populous*Counties.*Standard*errors*given*
in*parentheses.*'Note'also' in'Table'1' that' changes' in' the'absolute' income'of' the'20th'percentile'household' are' negatively' and' significantly' associated' with' changes' in'bankruptcy' filings.' This' finding' is' consistent' with' the' traditional' view' that'households' with' more' money' should' be' better' able' to' meet' their' financial'





obligations.' ' But' the' effect' is' small,' and' does' not' rule' out' the' notion' that' a'household’s' desired' consumption' may' increase' hand' in' hand' with' income.''Although' the' ΔDensity' variable' is' not' statistically' significant' at' conventional'levels,' this' may' reflect' the' existence' of' threshold' effects,' since' density' is'extremely'high'in'most'of'the'100'most'populous'counties.'
!
5.2!Divorce!Rates!The' dependent' variable' in' our' divorce' regressions' is' the' change' in' the'proportion' of' the' total' area' population' aged' 15' and' over' that' is' divorced.' ' In'these'regressions,'too,'we'include'the'standard'economic'and'socioJdemographic'factors' discussed' by' other' authors' in' the' relevant' literature.26 '' The' main'economic'factor'is'the'change'in'the'log'of'the'maximum'state'welfare'benefit'for'a'family'of'three,'which'captures'the'impact'of'the'1996'welfare'reform'that'gave'states'greater' latitude'in'distributing'welfare'benefits'(DlnWelfare).' 'The'socioJdemographic' factors' include' the' change' in' the' proportion' of' total' population'aged' 25' and' over' with' at' least' a' bachelor’s' degree' (DEdu),' the' change' in' the'proportion' of' women' aged' 16' and' over' in' the' labor' force' (DWomenLF),' the'change' in' the' proportion' of' total' households' receiving' retirement' income'(DRetInc),'and'the'change'in'the'average'household'size'(DHHSize).27''''Table' 2' reports' our' results' for' the' DlnGini' specification' for' the' 100' most'populous'counties.''''Note'in'Table'2'that'a'one'percent'rise'in'the'Gini'coefficient'is'associated'with'a'1.21'percent'increase'in'the'proportion'of'divorced'persons'in'highly'populated'counties.' ' ' 'Given' that' the'average'change' in' the'Gini'coefficient'between'1990'and'2000'was'4.41'percent'for'counties'in'our'sample,'the'estimate'implies'that'increased'inequality'was'associated'with'a'5.34'percent'increase'in'the'number'of'divorces'during'this'period.''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
26 See, for example, Friedberg 1998, Stevenson and Wolfers 2006, 2007. 
27 We do not expect differences in state divorce legislation to skew these results, as the largest change 
in divorce laws in recent times—the adoption of unilateral divorce and no-fault divorce—occurred 
prior to the start of our dataset. The bulk of these changes occurred in the 1970s, which means that they 
had been in place for over one decade by the time our dataset began. 















5.3!!Travel!Time!to!Work!In' these'regressions,'our'dependent'variable' is' the'change' in' the'proportion'of'all'workers'aged'16'and'over'whose'daily'commute'is'one'hour'or'more.' 'Here'again'we'include'a'variety'of'economic'and'demographic'characteristics'that'are'known' to' affect' our' dependent' variable.28''We' include' changes' in' the'median'household' income' (DNomP50).' ' Because' of' studies' finding' a' positive'relationship' between' race' and' commute' time,' particularly' for' AfricanJAmericans,'we' control' for' racial' characteristics' by' including' the' change' in' the'proportion'of'total'population'white'(DWhite)'and'the'change'in'the'proportion'of'total'population'black'(DBlack).''We'also'include'the'change'in'the'density'of'the'population'(DDensity),'this'time'to'control'for'changes'in'congestion'on'the'roads' and' in' the' public' transit' systems.' ' Finally,'we' include' the' change' in' the'proportion'of'total'population'receiving'retirement'income'(DRetInc),'to'control'for'the'portion'of'the'population'that'is'older'and'probably'not'commuting.'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
28 See, for example, Levinson and Kumar 2006, Khattak et al., 2000. 













Dependent*Variable:*Change* in* the*proportion*of* total*workers*ages*16*and*over*
with* one* hour* or* longer* daily* commute.* Sample:* 100* Most* Populous* Counties.*
Standard*errors*given*in*parentheses.**'The'estimated'coefficient' for'DGini' suggests' that,' as'hypothesized,' increases' in'income'inequality'are'positively'associated'with'changes'in'financial'distress,'as'manifested' in' this' instance' by' decisions' to' buy' cheaper,' but' less' conveniently'located,'housing.''For'counties'in'our'sample,'the'Gini'coefficient'went'up'by'an'average' of' 0.018' between' 1990' and' 2000.' ' Our' estimate' thus' implies' that'increased' inequality' is'on'average'associated'with'an' increase'of'0.0073' in' the'proportion' of' adults'with' commutes' longer' than' one' hour.' ' For' a' county' that'began' with' the' average' value' of' that' proportion' in' 2000' (0.09),' increased'inequality' is' thus' associated'with' a' rise' of' almost' 8' percent' in' the' number' of'adults'with'long'commutes.''For'Fairfax'County,'Virginia,'in'which'the'proportion'of' adults' with' long' commutes' in' 2000' was' 0.097,' and' which' had' the' largest'growth' in' inequality' during' the' decade' (DGini=' 0.038),' our' estimate' suggests'






6.!Our!Findings!in!Context!For'our'three'specific'measures'of'financial'distress,'our'findings'are'consistent'with'the'expenditure'cascade'hypothesis'and'at'odds'with'the'permanent'income'hypothesis.' ' Economists' seldom' change' their' views' about' the' efficacy' of'conventional'models'on'the'basis'of'isolated'regression'findings,'nor'should'they.''It' is' important' to' recognize,' however,' that' our' findings' are' part' of' a' broader'fabric'of'theoretical'and'empirical'research'that'conveys'a'consistent'message.''On' the' theoretical' side,' our' best' current' understanding' of' the' conditions' that'molded'human'nervous'systems'lends'no'support'to'models'in'which'individuals'care' only' about' absolute' resource' holdings.' ' No' serious' scientist' disputes' the'Darwinian'view'that'animal'drives'were'selected' for' their'capacity' to'motivate'behaviors'that'contribute'to'reproductive'success.''In'the'Darwinian'framework,'reproductive'success'is'all'about'relative'resource'holdings.''''For' example,' frequent' famines' were' an' important' challenge' in' early' human'societies,' but' even' in' the' most' severe' famines,' there' was' always' some' food.''Those' with' relatively' high' rank' got' fed,' while' others' often' starved.' ' ' On' the'plausible'assumption'that'individuals'with'the'strongest'concerns'about'relative'resource'holdings'were'most'inclined'to'expend'the'effort'necessary'to'achieve'high'rank,'such'individuals'would'have'been'more'likely'than'others'to'survive'food'shortages.''Relative'resource'holdings'were'also'important'in'implicit'markets'for'marriage'partners.'In'most'early'human'societies,'highJranking'males'took'multiple'wives,'leaving'many'lowJranking'males'with'none.29''So'here,'too,'theory'predicts'that'natural' selection' will' favor' individuals' with' the' strongest' concerns' about'relative' resource'holdings.'The'motivational' structure'expected'on' the'basis'of'theoretical' considerations' is' thus' consistent' with' the' expenditure' cascade'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
29 Konner, 1982. 





hypothesis' but' inconsistent' with' models' in' which' only' absolute' consumption'matters.'''On' the' empirical' side,' our' findings'on' the' link'between' inequality' and'various'measures'of'financial'distress'complement'similar'findings'by'other'researchers.''Using'OECD'data'across'countries'and'over'time,'for'example,'Bowles'and'Park'found'that'total'hours'worked'were'positively'associated'with'higher'inequality,'both'as'measured'by'the'90/50'ratio'and'the'Gini'coefficient.30''Using'specially'constructed'2000'Census'data'for'a'sample'of'200'school'districts'in'the'United'States,'OstvikJWhite'found'that'median'house'prices'were'substantially'higher'in'school' districts' with' higher' levels' of' income' inequality,' as' measured' by' the'95/50'ratio,'even'after'controlling'for'median'income.31''The'expenditure'cascade'hypothesis' is'also'consistent'with'detailed'patterns' in'crossJsection'data'that'are'not'predicted'by'the'permanent'income'or' lifeJcycle'hypotheses.' ' For' example,' as' James'Duesenberry'observed' in'his'1949'book,' a'black'family'with'a'given'absolute'income'would'have'had'higher'relative'income'in' the' segregated'neighborhoods'of' the' era' than' a'white' family'with' the' same'absolute' income.' ' And' as' Duesenberry' predicted,' the' savings' rates' of' black'families'with'a'given'income'level'were'higher'than'those'of'white'families'with'the' same' income.' The' permanent' income' hypothesis' and' the' life' cycle'hypothesis,'both'of'which'disavow'any'role'for'context'in'consumption'decisions,'predict'that'families'will'save'at'the'same'rate'irrespective'of'where'they'stand'in'their'respective'local'distributions'of'income.''The'expenditure'cascade'hypothesis'is'also'consistent'with'observed'patterns'in'international' savings' rates' that' are' not' predicted' by' traditional' consumption'theories.''The'aggregate'savings'rate,'for'example,'was'lower'in'the'United'States'than'in'Europe'in'1980,'and'the'gap'has'grown'larger'during'the'ensuing'years.'One'could'invoke'cultural'differences'to'explain'the'initial'gap,'but'the'prevailing'view'is'that'cultures'have'grown'more'similar'to'each'other'with'globalization,'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
30 Bowles and Park, 2002. 
31 Ostvik-White, 2003. 





which' leaves'growth' in' the'savings'gap'unexplained.' 'The'expenditure'cascade'hypothesis' suggests,' more' parsimoniously,' that' the' observed' patterns' in' the'savings'data'should'mirror'the'corresponding'patterns'in'the'inequality'data.''It'thus' suggests' that' Americans' saved' less' than' the' Europeans' in' 1980' because'inequality'was'much'higher' in' the'United'States' than' it'was' in'Europe.' 'And' it'suggests' that' the' savings' gap' has' grown'wider' because' income' inequality' has'been'growing'faster'in'the'United'States'than'in'Europe'in'the'years'since'then.32'' 'Finally,' the' expenditure' cascade'hypothesis' suggests' a' plausible' answer' to' the'question'of'why' aggregate' savings' rates'have' fallen' even' though' income'gains'have' been' largely' concentrated' in' the' hands' of' consumers' with' the' highest'incomes.' ' As' noted' earlier,' formal' versions' of' the' permanent' income' and' lifeJcycle'hypotheses'predict'no'link'between'aggregate'savings'rates'and'differential'rates'of' income'growth'across' income'classes.' 'As'a'practical'matter,'however,'modern'specifications'of'these'models'have'been'forced'to'accommodate'the'fact'that'savings'rates'rise'sharply'with'permanent'incomes'in'crossJsection'data.''If'we' take' that' fact' as' given,' the' observed' pattern' of' income' growth' in' recent'decades'would'seem'to'imply'a'secular'upward'trend'in'aggregate'savings'rates.''After'all,' the'lion’s'share'of'all'recent'income'gains'have'accrued'to'prosperous'families' with' the' highest' savings' rates.' ' And' yet,' as' noted,' aggregate' savings'rates'have'fallen'sharply.'' 'The' expenditure' cascade' hypothesis' suggests' that' the' apparent' contradiction'may' stem' from' the' fact' that' the' patterns' of' income' change' within' wealthy'groups'have'mimicked'those'we'observe'for'the'population'as'a'whole.''As'noted'earlier,' available' evidence' suggests' that' no' matter' how' we' partition' the'population,'income'gains'are'highly'concentrated'among'top'earners'within'each'group.' ' Again,' the' expenditure' cascade' hypothesis' stresses' that' local'comparisons' matter' most.' ' So' even' though' more' income' is' now' flowing' to'members'of'prosperous'groups,'most'members'of'such'groups'have'been'losing'ground' relative' to' their' most' prosperous' peers.' ' If' it' is' relative' income' that'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
32 Smeeding, 2001. 





drives' the' bequest' motive' and' if' local' context' is' what' really' matters,' the'observed'decline'in'aggregate'savings'rates'is'not'anomalous.!'
7.!Concluding!Remarks!Although' persuasive' theoretical' and' empirical' evidence' suggests' that'evaluations' of' consumption' goods' depend' on' context,' prevailing' economic'models' of' consumption'disavow'any' link'between' spending' and' context.' ' This'disavowal'has'become'increasingly'difficult'to'justify.''Prevailing'models'predict'that'savings'rates'will'not'vary'with'permanent'income;'and'that'savings'rates'at'all'levels—individual,'local,'or'national—should'be'insensitive'to'changes'in'the'distribution' of' income.' ' Prevailing'models' also' predict' that' changes' in' income'inequality' should' not' influence' either' the' number' of' hours' people' choose' to'work'or'the'median'price'of'housing'where'they'live.''Each'of'these'predictions'is'contradicted'by'experience.''''Economists'have'generally'responded'by'incorporating'ad'hoc'modifications'into'traditional' theories—as,' for'example,'by'positing'a'bequest'motive' for'wealthy'consumers' to' accommodate' the' fact' that' savings' rates' rise' sharply' with'permanent' income'in'crossJsection'data.' 'Such'moves,'however,'generally'raise'more'questions' than' they' answer.' 'Why,' for' example,' should' only' the'wealthy'wish'to'leave'bequests'to'their'children?''''Our' claim' is' that' existing' fact' patterns' and' theoretical' constraints' can' be'accommodated' parsimoniously' by' simple' variants' of' James' Duesenberry’s'relative'income'hypothesis.' 'We'have'argued'that'a'simple'model'incorporating'contextJdependence' predicts' a' clear' link' between' income' inequality' and'observed'savings'rates.''Such'a'model'predicts,'for'example,'that'the'savings'rate'of' any' reference' group'will' decline'when' income' inequality'within' that' group'rises.''This'prediction'is'consistent'with'observed'patterns'in'U.S.'Census'data'for'the' 50' states' and' the' 100'most' populous' counties' between' 1990' and' 2000,' a'period'during'which' income' inequality'was' rising' rapidly.' ' It' is'also'consistent'with' links' found'by'other' authors'between' inequality' and'hours'worked.' ' It' is'consistent' as' well' with' links' found' by' other' authors' between' inequality' and'





median'house'prices.' 'Finally,' it' is'consistent'with'numerous'observed'patterns'in'crossJnational'savings'data.''''On' the' strength' of' available' theoretical' and' empirical' evidence,' Mr.'Duesenberry’s'relative'income'hypothesis'clearly'merits'a'closer'look.!!












c1 = 11+ β1/σR1/σ Y +
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' ' ' ' ' ' (A2)'
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
33 Milgrom and Roberts, 1990. 
34 Ballester et al, 2006. 












c1i = γ1Yi +
γ 2
ni
GiC1 ' ' ' ' ' ' (A3)'We' then' normalize' the' adjacency' matrix' G' by' dividing' every' entry' by' ni,''corresponding' to' it’s' row' i.'Using' the' resultant'normalized'matrix'GN'we' solve'for'the'equilibrium'consumption'decision'in'the'network:''
€ 
c1i = γ1Yi +γ 2GiNC1
C1 = γ1Y +γ 2GNC1
C1 = (I −γ 2GN )−1γ1Y
' ' ' ' ' ' (A4)'
'Given' an' empty' network' (i.e.' nobody' belonging' to' anybody' else’s' reference'group),' the' result' coincided' with' the' standard' permanent' income' result' and'consumption'is'simply'a'constant'fraction'of'permanent'income:'
€ 
C1 = γ1Y .'When'the'network'is'nonJempty'than'the'standard'solution'gets'preJmultiplied'by'the'matrix'
€ 
(I −γ 2GN )−1 ,' which' corresponds' to' a' measure' of' network' centrality'developed'by'Bonacich'(1987).'''When'
€ 
γ 2is' smaller' than' the' inverse' of' the'modulo' of' the' largest' eigenvalue' of'
NG then'the'inverse' 1][ −− NGI απ (I!απG!)!!'can'be'expressed'as:''
€ 
[I − γ 2GN ]−1 = (γ 2GN )s
s=0
∞
∑ '' (A5)''By' the' PerronJFrobinius' theorem' the' largest' eigenvalue' of' NG 'is' smaller' then'the'maximum'sum'across'rows.'Since'by'definition'every'row'of' NG 'sums'up'to'one,'and'
€ 
γ 2'is'smaller'than'one'by'construction,' the'condition'for'the' inverse' is'always'satisfied.'Examining'an'individual'element'(i,j)'in'the'matrix,'we'see'that:''






{[I − γ 2GN ]−1}(i, j ) = (γ 2)s{(GN )s}(i, j )
s=0
∞
∑ 'One'of'the'properties'of'the'adjacency'matrix'is'that' s jiG ),()( 'counts'the'number'of'paths' of' length' s 'starting' in' j' and' ending' in' i.' Hence'
€ 
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risk8taking* by* financial* professionals* in* the* run8up* to* the* latest*
financial* crisis.*We* show* that* when* gloating* is* stronger* than* envy*
(i.e.* when* utility* is* comparison8convex)* then* social* comparison*
induces*risk8seeking.*Another* implication*of*comparison8convexity* is*
a* preference* for* negatively* correlated* outcomes.* We* test* these*
propositions* with* an* investment* game* with* and* without* the*
possibility* of* social* comparison.*We* find* a* bit*more* than* a* third* of*
subjects*prefer*negatively*correlated*outcomes*and*social*comparison*
induces* 50%* higher* risky* investment* among* those* subjects.* Those*
subjects* that* prefer* positively* correlated* outcomes* do* not*
significantly*increase*their*risky*investments*when*social*comparison*
is*possible.**JEL:'C91;'D01,'D14,'D81*





1.!Introduction.*In'the'popular'press'the'excessive'riskJtaking'by'banks'in'the'runJup'to'the'latest'financial' crisis' is' often' blamed' on' a' ‘bonus' culture’' among' financial'professionals.'The'habit'of'comparing'the'size'of'their'annual'bonuses'with'that'of' their'colleagues'would'have' induced'Wall'Street'bankers'to'engage'in'highly'leveraged' and' risky' bets' in' order' to' outperform' their' peers.' And' indeed' in' a'recent'survey'among'risk'and'compliance'officers'at'financial'services'firms'72%'of'respondents'said' the'bonus'culture'had' led' to'“uncontrollable'riskJtaking”.35'Recently,' Demarzo,' Kaniel' and' Kremer' (2008)' showed' that' such' relative'concerns'can'in'fact'lead'to'asset'bubbles.'''And' it' may' not' just' be' greedy' bankers' who' take' on' more' risk' in' order' to'outperform' their' peers.' There' is' some' suggestive' evidence' that' Mr.' and' Mrs.'Jones'could'be'vulnerable'to'the'impulse'as'well.'Stock'market'participation'has'been' found' to'be' increasing' in' the'amount'of' social' interaction'of' a'household'(Hong' et' al.,' 2004),' and' in' the' average' stock' market' participation' of' the'neighborhood'(Brown'et'al,'2008).'The'more'you'associate'with'your'neighbors,'the' more' opportunities' there' are' to' compare' your' financial' position,' and' the'more'you'could'be'induced'to'gamble'on'the'stock'market'in'order'to'keep'up.36'''Also'within'firms,'social'emotions'such'as'envy'and'gloating'could'affect'the'kind'of' projects' managers' undertake.' It' has' been' shown' that' career' concerns' can'induce'excessive'risk'taking'by'managers'(Hermalin,'1993;'DeMarzo'and'Duffie,'1995).' The' same' goes' for' explicit' tournament' rewards' (Hvide,' 2002;' Taylor,'2003).'Indeed'it'seems'that'highJtech'firms'with'more'risk'taking'flexibility'are'less'likely'to'base'executive'compensation'on'relative'performance'(Fung,'2009).'In'all'of' the'above'models' the'performance'of'others'directly'affects'your'own'potential'payoff'through'explicit'incentives.'But'what'if'people'care'about'other'people’s' outcomes' even' when' that’s' not' the' case?' Then' social' comparison' in'itself' could' induce' risk' taking.' This'would'be' especially' the' case'when' explicit'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
35 Brooke Masters, “Bonus measures fail to reform risk takers.”, Financial Times, January 11, 2010. 
36 The fact that many people see the stock market as a form of gambling is illustrated by the negative 
correlation between lottery prizes and stock market participation found by Kumar (2009) and Gao and 
Lin (2010). 





incentives' are' quite' weak,' such' as' in' the' case' of' CEO’s' (Jensen' and' Murphy,'1990).' So' far' however,' the' study' of' social' preferences' and' performance' has'mainly' focused' on' effort' provision' (Fershtman' et' al,' 2004;' Goel' and' Thakor,'2005;'Dur'and'Glazer,'2007).''There'are'a'few'theoretical'papers'that'study'the'effect'of'social'comparison'and'the' concern' for' social' status' on' riskJtaking.' Robson' (1992)' shows' that' when'utility'is'convex'in'relative'wealth'individuals'will'engage'in'risky'gambles'until'a'stable'income'distribution'is'reached'where'all'fair'gambles'are'rejected.'Becker'et' al' (2005)' extend' the' analysis' and' show' that' even'with' concave' utility' over'both' wealth' and' status' individuals' could' rationally' accept' fair' gambles.'Furthermore' risk' taking' is' shown' to' be' increasing' in' the' equality' of' initial'endowments.' Hopkins' (2010)' recently' extended' the' analysis' and' shows' that'while' riskJtaking' is' decreasing' in' the' inequality' of' initial' endowments' it' is'increasing'in'the'inequality'in'rewards'to'status.'''As'it'is'extremely'difficult'to'study'the'effects'of'social'comparison'in'the'field37,'in'this'paper'we'examine'the'influence'of'social'comparison'on'risk'preferences'experimentally.' We' do' this' by' eliciting' choices' over' risky' prospects' both' in'isolation'and'in'a'context'where'social'comparison'is'possible.''In'the'same'way'that'choices'over'risky'gambles'reflect'the'shape'and'curvature'of' a'utility' function'over'monetary'outcomes,' risky'gambles' in'a' social' context'would'reflect'the'shape'and'curvature'of'the'social'comparison'function.''One'of'the'central'aspects'of'this'social'comparison'function'is'whether'it' is'convex'or'concave'(Clark'and'Oswald,'1997),'or'put'another'way'whether'social'gains'loom'larger' than' social' losses' or' the' reverse' (Maccheroni,'Marinacci' and'Rustichini,'2009).' This' distinction' has' surprisingly' large' implications.' Clark' and' Oswald'show' that' comparisonJconcave' preferences' lead' to' emulation' and' herding'behaviour,' whereas' comparisonJconvex' preferences' give' rise' to' deviance' and'diversity.'Maccheroni'et'al.'show'that'these'results'hold'broadly'and'only'depend'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
37 One would need reliable data on whom people compare themselves with, their own choices and these 
others’ choices, and then control for endogeneity effects. This problem is known as the reflection 
problem (Manski, 1993.) 





on' the' convexity' of' the' kink' around' the' reference' point.' We' show' that' the'distinction' also' affects' preferences' over' positively' or' negatively' correlated'outcomes' in'gambles.'With'comparisonJconcave'preferences,' individuals'would'prefer'positively'correlated'gambles'(if'you'win'I'win,'and'when'you'lose'I'lose).'With' comparisonJconvex' preferences' individuals' would' prefer' negatively'correlated' outcomes' (when' I'win' you' lose,' and' vice' versa).' Furthermore'with'comparisonJconvex'preferences'social'comparison'induces'more'risk'taking.'The'latter'would'be'the'mechanism'that'explains'why'social'comparison'could'lead'to'more'risky'trading'in'financial'firms,'more'stock'market'participation'the'more'you'interact'with'your'neighbours,'and'overly'risky'decisions'by'managers'in'a'firm.''That'social'comparison'can'influence'behavior'is'an'old'and'by'now'established'idea' in' the' social' sciences.'By'now' its' implications'have'been' studied' in'many'terrains.'Veblen'(1899)'looked'at'how'consumption'is'used'to'signal'social'class.'Duesenberry' (1949)' studies' how' relative' income' affects' saving.'Hirsch' (1976)'and' Frank' (1985)' looked' at' demand' for' positional' and' nonJpositional' goods.''Relative'preferences'have'been'linked'to'wage'compression'within'firms'(Frank'1984),' excessive' consumption' of' status' goods' (Ireland' 1998;' Hopkins' and'Kornienko,' 2004),' economic' growth' (Corneo' and' Jeanne,' 1996;' Cooper' et' al,'2001),'happiness'(Luttmer,'2004),'the'Easterlin'paradox'(Clark'et'al,'2008)'and'wage' satisfaction' (Clark' et' al.' 2009).' Furthermore' the' existence' of' relative'preferences' would' have' implications' for' public' good' provision' and' taxation'(Aronsson'and''JohanssonJStenman,'2008;'Ireland,'2001),'environmental'policy'(Wendner,' 2005)' and' even' stabilization' policy' (Ljunqvist' and' Uhlig,' 2000).' It'should' be' noted' that'most' of' the' conclusions' of' these' papers' follow' from' the'assumption' of' comparisonJconcave' preferences.' With' comparisonJconcave'utility' in' consumption' or' social' status,' those' that' fall' behind' experience'increased'marginal'utility'of'consumption'and'thus'increase'their'expenditure'on'conspicuous'or'status'goods,'leading'to'inefficient'outcomes'where'everybody'is'running'to'stay' in'the'same'place.'Furthermore,'when'social' losses' loom'larger'than' social' gains,' a'mutual' comparison'would' result' in' a' net' utility' loss.' Thus'optimal' policy' would' seek' to' reduce' differences' in' income' and' status.' With'





comparisonJconvex' preferences' by' contrast' policy' should' be' geared' towards'increasing'these.''Only' recently' have' people' started' studying' social' preferences' using' risky'choices,' although' so' far' only' in' laboratory' contexts.' Bault' et' al' (2008)' elicited'subjects’' subjective' emotional' response' to' the' outcomes' of' lotteries' on' a' 100Jpoint' scale' from' “extremely' negative”' to' “extremely' positive”.' They' also'measured'more' objective' physiological' reactions' such' as' heart' rates' and' skin'conductance.'They'find'that'when'subjects'can'observe'both'their'own'outcomes'and' the' outcomes' of' another' subject,' they' react'more' strongly' to' social' gains'than' to' social' losses.' Linde' and' Sonnemans' (2009)' find' that' people' are'more'riskJseeking' when' outcomes' are' contextualized' as' social' gains' than' as' social'losses.' Schoenberg' and' Haruvy' (2010)' show' that' larger' asset' bubbles' occur'when'subjects'learn'about'the'wealth'of'the'leading'trader'than'when'they'learn'about'the'wealth'of'the'laggard.'''We'add'to'this'literature'in'several'ways.'First'of'all'we'allow'subjects'to'choose'either' positively' correlated' or' negatively' correlated' outcomes,' thereby' testing'the' findings' of' Bault' et' al.' Their' conclusion' that' social' gains' loom' larger' than'social' losses' was' based' on' selfJreported' satisfaction' with' outcomes' and' on'physiological' reactions' such' as' heart' rate' and' skin' conductance.' Our' setup'directly'tests'behavioral'predictions'based'on'their'findings.'Second,'in'our'setup'subjects'can'choose'among'a'continuous'range'of' risk' taking,' instead'of'binary'choices' between' lotteries.' This' allows' us' to' study' the' second' prediction' that'comparisonJconvex' preferences' induce' more' risk' taking.' We' will' also' further'explore'the'effect'of'inequality'on'riskJtaking.''' '





2.!Theory.!Suppose'that'a'person'has'a'standard'(increasing,'concave)'utility'u(x0)'over'own'outcome'x0,'and'an'additive'comparison'utility'v(x0,x1)'over'the'difference'with'someone'else’s'outcome'x1.38'''' ' ! !!, !! = !! !! + !(!!, !!)'' '' ' ' (1)''We'then'assume'a'piecewise'linear'function'for'v(x0,x1)'as'in'Fehr'and'Schmidt.39'The' linearity'keeps'the'analysis'simple'and'as'Macheroni'et'al.' (2009)'showed,'the' results'would'carry' through' for'more'complicated'specifications'as' long'as'there'is'a'kink'around'the'reference'point.''' ' ! !!, !! = !max !! − !!!, 0 − !!max!{!! − !!, 0}' '(2)'' ' 'The' first' part' of' this' specification' reflects' the' feeling' of' gloating:' enjoying'positive' utility' from'having' a' better' outcome' than' your' peer.' The' second' part'reflects' the' feeling' of' envy:' suffering' negative' utility' having' a' worse' outcome'than'your'peer.'Social'gains'are'multiplied'by'the'coefficient'!,'and'social'losses'by' the' coefficient'!.' This' specification' parsimoniously' fits' the' several' theories'for' social' preferences.'With' parameters'! = ! = 0,' social' comparison'does' not'play' a' role' at' all.' When' gloating' is' stronger' than' envy' (! > ! )' utility' is'comparisonJconvex:'social'gains' loom' larger' than'social' losses,' in' line'with' the'findings' of' Bault' et' al.' For' parameter' values'0 < ! < !,' utility' is' comparisonJconcave:'envy'is'stronger'than'gloating'and'social'losses'loom'larger'than'social'gains.' Finally,'when'! < 0'individuals' are' inequityJaverse,' that' is' they'both'get'disutility'from'disadvantageous'inequality'and'advantageous'inequality.'We'will'now'derive'two'implications'of'such'utility.''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
38 For the purpose of this paper we restrict the analysis to the case of a single social reference point. For 
a more extended treatment that allows for multiple reference points we refer the reader to Maccheroni 
et al (2009). 
39 Although note that compared to the Fehr-Schmidt specification we switched the parameters α and β 
to reflect the primacy of the gloating in our paper. 






Figure!1.! Three!different! specifications! of! the! social! comparison! value! functions.!On! the!
left!comparisonFconvex!utility,!in!the!middle!comparisonFconcave!utility!and!on!the!right!
inequality!averse!utility.!'The'first'implication'is'a'derivative'of'the'Clark'and'Oswald'(1996)'conclusions'applied'to'risky'outcomes.'As'comparisonJconcave'utility'yields'a'preference'for'emulation,' it' also' implies' a' preference' for' positively' correlated' outcomes.'Likewise' as' comparisonJconvex' utility' yields' a' preference' for' diversity' it' also'implies'a'preference'for'negatively'correlated'outcomes.40''As'an'example'take'a'situation'where'both'you'and'your'peer'engage'in'a'simple'heads/tail'coin'lottery'with'earnings'of'E10,J'for'guessing'the'right'coin'side'and'E0,J'for'guessing'the'wrong'side.'When'gambling'on'the'outcome'of'a'single'coin'toss,'by'picking'the'same'coin'side'your'outcomes'will'also'be'the'same,'so'your'outcomes' will' be' positively' correlated' and' your' comparison' utility' will' equal'zero.' When' picking' the' opposite' coin' side' your' outcomes' are' negatively'correlated' and'your' comparison'utility'will' be' either' v(0,10)'or' v(10,0).'When''then' 'and' thus' you' would' pick' the' opposite'coin' side' as' your' opponent.' When' 'then' 'and'thus'you'would'prefer'the'positively'correlated'outcomes'from'picking'the'same'coin'side.41'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
40 This is similar to Roussanov’s (2010) argument that those who are mainly concerned by getting 
ahead of the Jones’ (as opposed to catching up), should underdiversify their portfolio’s. 
41 Note that in this example, as in the experiment, both the expected value and the variance is the same 
for both the positively and the negatively correlated gamble. In a more general setting individuals with 
comparison-convex utility would be willing accept lower expected value investments with higher 
variance in order to get negative correlation with others’ outcomes. This could explain why still a lot of 
people engage in buying individual stocks instead of investing in index funds. 
α > β (1 2)v(10, 0)+ (1 2)v(0,10)> 0
α < β (1 2)v(10, 0)+ (1 2)v(0,10)< 0






Proposition!1:!Subjects'will'prefer'negatively'correlated'gambles'iff'their'utility'function'is'comparisonJconvex'( ).'Conversely'subjects'will'prefer'positively'correlated' gambles' iff' their' utility' is' comparisonJconcave' ( ).' Subjects' are'indifferent'between'positively'and'negatively'correlated'gambles'iff'they'do'not'have'social'preferences'( )'or'their'comparison'utility'is'linear'( ).'
Proof:*See*appendix*B.*'The' second' implications' derived' from' the' convexity' of' the' social' comparison'function'when .'As'convex'utility'over'own'outcomes'implies'risk'seeking'in'individual'risky'choice,'so'does'adding'a'convex'comparison'term'to' the'utility'function'decrease'risk'aversion'when'social'comparison'is'possible!'
Proposition! 2.!When' utility' is' comparisonJconvex' ( ),' individuals' prefer'bigger'investments'in'risky'gambles'when'social'comparison'is'possible.'
Proof:*See*appendix*B.*
*





α = β = 0 α = β
α > β
α > β





(1997),' and' is' getting' used'more' often' recently,' see' e.g.' Charness' and' Gneezy'(2010).''In' order' to' investigate' the' impact' of' social' comparison' we' ran' two' kinds' of'treatments:' the' Comparison' treatment' (C)' and' the' No' Comparison' treatment'(NC).'''In' the' Comparison' treatment' subjects' are' matched' with' their' direct' physical'neighbour'in'the'laboratory'(called'the'NEIGHBOUR)'and'while'they'make'their'own' investment' decision' on' the' screen' they' simultaneously' see' the' decision'made'by'NEIGHBOUR' (both' gamble' amount'X' and'winning' coin' side).42'At' the'end'of' the' round' they'are' informed'both'of' their'own'payoff'and' the'payoff'of'NEIGHBOUR.'''Subjects'participate'in'the'lottery'by'betting'on'the'outcome'of'a'coin'toss:'Heads'or'Tail.'Usually'one'of' the' subjects'will'have' the'winning'coin'side'assigned' to'them'by'the'computer,'e.g.'“Your'winnings'coin'side'this'rounds'will'be'Heads”.'The'neighbouring'subject' is' then' informed'that' the'NEIGHBOUR'has'a'winning'coin'side'of'Heads,'and'is'then'asked'to'select'her'own'winning'coin'side,'either'Heads'or'Tail.'By'choosing'the'same'coin'side'as'their'NEIGHBOUR,'payoffs'will'be' positively' correlated,' and' by' choosing' a' different' coin' side' as' NEIGHBOUR'payoffs'will'be'negatively'correlated.''''Out' of' twelve' rounds' on' average' subjects'made' a' coin' side' choice' four' times,'while'their'NEIGHBOUR'also'made'four'coin'side'choices,'and'four'times'the'coin'side' would' be' assigned' to' both' subjects.43'At' the' start' of' the' experiments'subjects'were'asked'to'briefly'shake'hands'with'their'neighbour'and'wish'each'other'luck.'At'the'end'of'every'round'subjects'are'asked'to'rate'their'subjective'satisfaction' with' the' outcome' on' a' scale' from' “Extremely' Negative”' to'“Extremely'Positive”.''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
42 Subjects were able to continuously update their decisions throughout each  40 second decision 
period. 
43 The double assignment of coin choices in a third of the rounds was to ensure that we would collect 
observations on both positively correlated and negatively correlated outcomes for all subjects.  





'''''In'the'No'Comparison'treatment'subjects'made'their'decisions'in'isolation:'they'only'saw'their'own'decision'and'outcomes,'and'not'those'of'their'NEIGHBHOUR.''Half'the'time'their'winning'coin'side'was'assigned,'and'half'the'time'they'were'asked'to'choose'their'own'winning'coin'side.'Screenshots'are'shown'in'Appendix''C.''In'the'first'12'rounds'of'the'experiment'the'initial'endowment'was'held'constant'at' E8,J.' In' the' second' stage' of' the' experiment' initial' endowments' were'randomized'according'to'a'uniform'distribution'between'E2,J'and'E14,J.'Subjects'were'informed'at'the'beginning'of'each'round'of'their'endowment'that'round.'In'the'Comparison'treatment'subjects'were'shown'both'their'own'endowment'and'their'NEIGHBOUR’s'endowment.'''After'all' stages'had'been'completed'a'questionnaire'was'administered.'Besides'the' usual' questions' about' age,' gender' and' university' department,' three'additional'measures'were'included.'The'first'was'a'similarity'question.'Subjects'were'asked'to'rate'their'NEIGHBOUR'on'a'10Jpoint'similarity'scale'from'1'(“The'person' at' this' university' least' similar' to' me”)' to' 10' (“The' person' at' this'university'most'similar'to'me”).'This'question'is'motivated'by'the'finding'in'the'psychology'literature'that'emotions'related'to'social'comparison'are'most'salient'with' those' whom' we' consider' similar' to' us.' Also' included' was' an' 8Jitem'Dispositional' Envy' Scale' questionnaire' developed' by' Smith' et' al' (1999),' that'purports'to'measure'the'enviousness'of'a'respondent.'And'finally'we'included'a'14Jitem' Competitiveness' Index' developed' by' Houston' (2009).' After' the'questionnaire'was' completed,'one'of' the'24' rounds'was' randomly' selected' for'payoff'and'subjects'were'informed'about'their'final'earnings'for'the'experiment.''





In'December'2010,' and'April' 201144,' a' total' of' six' experimental' sessions'were'deployed' at' the' Center' for' Research' in' Experimental' Economics' and' Political'Decision' making' (CREED)' at' the' Universiteit' van' Amsterdam.' Out' of' 138'subjects,' 48' subjects' participated' in' the' No' Comparison' treatment' and' 90'subjects' participated' in' the' Comparison' treatment.' ' Average' payments' were'E14,50J'including'a'E5,J'showJup'fee.'''Subjects'were'seated'behind'computer'screens'and'divided'by'separators'such'that'they'could'not'see'the'screens'of'other'participants.'Subjects'were'given'five'minutes'to'read'the'instructions,'after'which'the'experimenter'went'through'the'instructions'and'cleared'up'any'questions'that'arose.''For' the' comparison' treatment' subjects' were' matched' with' their' physical'neighbour'in'the'lab.'The'lab'was'arranged'in'rows'of'four,'with'computer'labels'Ax,'Bx,'Cx'and'Dx,'where'x'corresponds'to'the'row'number.'All'A'subjects'were'matched'with' B' subjects' and' C' subjects'were'matched'with'D' subjects.' In' the'instruction'subjects'were'informed'that'they'would'be'seeing'feedback'on'their'neighbour' during' the' experiment' and'were' invited' to' briefly' shake' hands' and'wish'each'other'luck'before'the'start'of'the'session.45'''The' experimental' setup' was' programmed' with' the' help' of' the' experimental'software'zJTree'(Fischbacher,'2007).''
4.!Hypotheses!'Assuming' a' significant' proportion' of' subjects' with' comparisonJconcave'preferences,'we'can'make'the'following'hypotheses:''
H1:"Average' gambles' are' higher' in' the' Comparison' treatment' than' in' the' No'Comparison'treatment.**''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
44 In the first three sessions females were undersampled, making up only one-third of the subjects. To 
investigate potentially interesting gender effects, additional sessions were run in april where females 
were oversampled.  
45 Introducing the subjects to each other could potentially have lead to risk-sharing behavior among 
subjects. However given the impossibility of communicating otherwise throughout the treatment, and 
the unenforceability of any agreement we do not believe this could have played a role.  






H2:! The' stronger' a' subject’s' preference' for' negatively' correlated' gambles,' the'more'a'subject'will'gamble'in'the'Comparison'treatment.''
5.!Results!First'we'will' look'at' the' first'part'of' the'experiment'where' initial'endowments'were'equal,' so'exJante' inequality' should'play'no' role.'Here,'out'of' a'maximum'gamble'of'E8.00,'subjects'invested'on'average'E4.16'(52%'of'endowment)'in'the'No'Comparison'treatment'and'E5.59'(70%)'in'the'Comparison'treatment.46'Thus'gambles'are'on'average'about'30%'higher'in'the'Comparison'treatment,' in'line'with'H1.!
!
Table!1.!H1:!Average!gambles!are!higher!in!the!Comparison!treatment!
! Mean!Gamble! SD!Comparison'Treatment' 5.59***' 2.74'No'Comparison'Treatment' 4.16' 2.73'
!In'the'No'Comparison'the'distribution'of'gamble'decisions'shows'two'significant'modes,'one'at'investing'the'entire'endowment,'and'one'at'investing'slightly'less'than' half' the' endowment' (see' fig.' A3' in' Appendix' A).' Only' 25%' of' all' gamble'decisions' involve' the' entire' endowment.' By' contrast' in' the' Comparison'treatment' 47%' of' gambles' are' equal' to' the' entire' endowment.' Furthermore,'average'gamble'sizes'are'quite'stable'over'time'(see'fig.'A4'in'Appendix'A).''In'the'comparison'treatment'subjects'made'a'decision'about'their'winning'coin'side' between' three' and' five' times' during' the' twelve' rounds.' Out' of' 354' coin'decisions'made' in' the'Comparison' treatment,' there'were'179' (51%)'decisions'for'the'opposite'coins'side'as'NEIGHBOUR.'These'choices'resulted'in'negatively'correlated' outcomes.' ' While' 175' (49%)' choices' were' for' the' same' coin' side,'resulting' in'positively'correlated'outcomes.' 'These'results'could'be' interpreted'in'two'ways:'either'subjects'did'not'take'into'account'whether'outcomes'would'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
46 Wilcoxon test for difference in average gamble: p<0.001. 







gamble!more.!!' Mean!Gamble! SD!No'Comparison'Treatment' 4.16' 2.73'Comparison'Treatment'''''''Opposite'side'>50%'of'the'time' 6.30***' 2.41'Comparison'Treatment'''''''''Same'side'>'50%'of'the'time' 4.97' 2.81'''While'41%'of'subjects'chose'the'same'coin'side'more'than'half'the'time,'36%'of'subjects' chose' the' opposite' coin' side' over' half' the' time,' and' 23%' of' subjects'chose'the'same'and'opposite'coins'side'the'same'amount'of'times.'We'compare'the'gambles'of' those' subjects' that' chose' the'opposite' coin' side'more' than'half'the'time'with'those'that'chose'the'same'coin'side'over'half' the'time' in'table'2.'Those' with' a' preference' for' the' opposite' coin' side' gamble' significantly' more'(Average'gamble'is'E6.30,'79%'of'endowment,'and'50%'more'than'the'average'in' the' no' comparison' treatment)' than' those' who' prefer' the' same' coin' side'(average' gamble' is' E4.97,' 62%' of' endowment).47'In' fact' the' gambles' of' those'who'have'a'preference'for'the'same'coin'side'are'not'significantly'different'from'the' No' Comparison' treatment48,' while' the' difference' is' highly' significant' for'those'with'opposite'coin'preferences.49''The' test' for' the' robustness' of' the' above' finding' we' construct' a' measure'OppositeCoin' which' is' defined' by' the' number' of' opposite' coin' choices' out' of'total'number'of'coin'choices'made.'Thus'OppositeCoin'varies'from'0'for'subjects'that' always' chose' positively' correlated' gambles,' to' 1' for' subjects' that' always'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
47 Wilcoxon test for difference in average gamble: p=0.03 
48 Wilcoxon test for difference in average gamble: p>0.10. 
49 Wilcoxon test for difference in average gamble: p<0.001. 





chose'negatively'correlated'gambles.'In'a'way'OppositeCoin'proxies'for'the'ratio'between' α' and' β' where' a' value' higher' than' 0.5' corresponds' to' .' The'results'are'shown'in'table'A1'of'the'appendix.'''Under' all' specifications' the' coefficient' for' OppositeCoin' is' positive' and'significant.'Those'who'prefer'negatively'correlated'gambles'on'average'gamble'more'than'two'euro'more'than'those'that'prefer'positively'correlated'gambles.'Thus' a' revealed' preference' for' negatively' correlated' outcomes' is' indeed'associated'with'more'riskJtaking'as'H2'predicted.''There' are' also' a' few' other' interesting' patterns' in' the' data.' Own' average' past'payoffs' and' fraction' of' rounds' won' so' far' do' not' seem' to' matter' in' and' of'themselves,' but' only' in' the' way' they' relate' to' the' neighbour’s' payoffs' and'winnings.'Gamble'size'is'decreasing'in'the'log'of'the'ratio'of'own'payoffs'over'the'neighbour’s'payoffs,'so'the'further'you'are'ahead,'the'less'you'gamble.'However'having'won'more'rounds'than'the'neighbor'so'far,'actually'increases'the'Gamble'size.'Thus'the'overall'effect'of'relative'past'performance'is'somewhat'ambiguous.''As'usual'we' find'a'gender'effect'where'males' choose'bigger'gamble' sizes' than'females'(see'Croson'and'Gneezy,'2010;'Eckel'and'Grossman,'2008),'however'the'gender'of'the'neighbour'does'not'seem'to'play'a'role'here.50'Out'of'the'measure'constructed'from'questionnaire'at'the'end'of'the'experiment,'only'the'Enjoyment'of'Competition'measure'significantly'affects'gambling'size.'Neither'Dispositional'Envy,' nor' the' reported' similarity' of' the' neighbor' show' up' as' significant.' The'effect' of' enjoyment' of' competition' is' rather' sizeable' though:' increasing' this'measure' from' the' lowest' to' the' highest' level' is' associated'with' an' increase' in'gamble' size' of' more' than' two' Euro,' a' similar' effect' size' as' the' OppositeCoin'Measure.'''Interestingly,'although'we'find'the'implications'of'the'Bault'et'al.'findings,'we'do'not' replicate' their' result.'They' found'a'stronger'subjective'emotional' response'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
50 However as we will see the neighbour’s gender effect does turn out significant in the unequal 
endowment treatment. 
α > β





for'social'gains'than'for'social' losses.'We'find'little'influence'of'the'neighbour’s'outcome' on' emotional' response' (see' fig.' A5' in' appendix' A).' One' possible'explanation' could' be' that' in' their' experiment' subjects' were' more' willing' to'truthfully' reveal' gloating' when' the' neighbour' lost' because' subjects' were'attached' to' heart' rate' and' skin' conductance'monitors.' In' effect' subjects' were'attached'to'lie'detectors.'Another'explanation'would'be'that'in'their'experiment'subjects'were'choosing'between'options'with'different'risk'and'payoff'profiles.'In'our'setup'expected'payoffs'were'the'same'whether'you'choose'heads'or'tails.'Thus'subjects'maybe'experience'less'regret'and'envy'when'choosing'the'wrong'coin'side,'and'less'relief'and'gloating'when'choosing'the'right'coin'side.''
!We'will'now'look'at'the'second'part'where'endowments'were'unequal.'As'initial'endowments' for' the' subjects' and' their' neighbours' were' drawn' from'independent' uniform' distributions,' every' round' started' with' an' inequality' in'endowments.' The' average' percentages' of' initial' endowment' gambled' were'broadly'similar'in'the'inequality'and'fixed'endowment'treatments'(72%'vs'70%'in'the'comparison'treatment'and'51%'vs'53%'in'the'no'comparison'treatment).''We' investigate' the' effect' of' unequal' relative' endowments' on' riskJtaking' by'regressing'the'gamble'percentage'on'a'number'of'measures'including'the'log'of'the' endowment' ratio,' and' a' dummy' variable' for' having' the' bigger' initial'endowment' (see' table' 2' in' Appendix' A).' The' measure' OppositeCoin' is' still' a'significant'predictor'of'gamble'sizes'(although'more'marginally'significant'than'before).'The'percentage'of'the'endowment'that'is'gambled'is'declining'in'the'size'of'the'initial'endowment,'consistent'with'Increasing'Relative'Risk'Aversion'(Holt'and'Laury,'2002).'''However' none' of' the' relative' measure' of' initial' endowment' show' up' as'significant'in'the'estimation.'Neither'the'log'of'the'initial'endowment'ratio,'nor'the'dummy'variable' for' the'higher' initial'endowment'show'up'as'significant' in'any'of' the'specifications.'This' is'a'somewhat'surprising'result.'Especially'given'that' the' measures' of' past' relative' performance' do' show' up' as' (marginally)'significant.''






6.!Discussion!and!Conclusion!This'paper'has' investigated'the'effect'of'social'comparison'on'riskJtaking.' 'The'two'main'results'are'that'1)'Increasing'the'potential'for'social'comparison'with'a'neighbor'increases'the'amount'of'financial'risk'taken'by'subjects'and'2)'subjects'that' prefer' negatively' correlated' outcomes' invest' significantly'more' in' a' risky'lottery'when'social'comparison'is'possible.'''These' results' point' to' the' fact' that' most' individuals' have' competitive'preferences:' they' enjoy' having' better' outcomes' than' others.' This' goes' against'the'recent' literature'on' fairness'preferences'and' inequality'aversion' (Fehr'and'Schmidt,' 1999;' Bolton' and' Ockenfels,' 2000)' that' assumes' that' people' are'adverse' to' even' advantageous' inequality.' However' these' inequalityJaverse'preferences'are'usually'found'in'zeroJsum'experiments'where'subjects'can'only'make' themselves' better' off' by'making' someone' else'worse' off.52'Indeed' it' has'recently'been'found'that'(perceived)'intentions'matter'a'great'deal'in'these'kind'of'games'(Falk'et'al,'2008)'and'that'behaviour'in'dictator'games'and'trust'games'is'largely'determined'by'dispositional'guiltJaversion'and'reciprocity'(Regner'and'Harth,'2010).'These'setups'are'thus'not'good'environments'to'test'preferences'over' outcomes' when' guilt' is' not' a' psychological' factor' at' play,' such' as' when'outcomes' are' the' result' of' individual' risky' decisions.' As' inequalityJaverse'preferences'are'strongly'comparisonJconvex'they'would'have'predicted'a'strong'preference'for'positively'correlated'outcomes.'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
51 Wilcoxon test for the difference in average gamble: p=0.10. 
52 An exception would be the generosity game by Guth  (2010), where increasing the other’s payoff 
does not reduce the decider’s payoff. However even in that game the only way in which a decider can 
increase their relative outcomes is by decreasing the outcomes of the other. 





The'second'important'point'to'note'is'that'it'seems'that'the'standard'findings'of'prospect'theory'do'not'map'onto'social'reference'points'oneJbyJone.'In'prospect'theory' losses' loom' larger' than' gains' (Kahneman' and'Tversky,' 1979),'whereas'we' show' that' for' a' significant' part' of' the' subject' population' social' gains' loom'larger'than'social' losses.'Earlier'Linde'and'Sonnemans'(2009)'have'shown'that'when'it'comes'to'social'reference'points'subjects'are'risk'seeking'in'social'gains'instead'of'losses'as'predicted'by'standard'prospect'theory.'Taken'together'with'the'findings'of'Bault'et'al'(2008)'it'thus'seems'that'people'react'very'differently'to'social'reference'points'than'to'private'ones.'This'is'an'issue'worthy'of'further'investigation.''Our' results' also' have' some' important' other' implications.' First' of' all' it' would'provide' an' additional' explanation' for' the' finding' that' people'with'more' social'interaction' invest' more' in' the' stock' market.' Second,' it' implies' that' for'professions'where'people'have'significant' latitude' in'determining' the'riskiness'of' their' strategies,' such' as' financial' traders' or' high' level' managers,' social'competition' could' lead' to' increased' riskJtaking.' But' besides' influencing' the'amount' of' risk' taken,' social' comparison' could' also' influence' the' kinds' of' risk'taken' and' lead' people' to' choose' highly' idiosyncratic' strategies' for' their'investment'portfolios'in'a'search'for'negatively'correlated'investments.''Finally' the' results' have' implications' for' the' theoretical' literature' on' social'comparison' that' relies' on' comparisonJconcave' preferences.' Most' of' the'literature'on'optimal'taxation'and'relative'consumption'derive'their'results'from'comparisonJconcave' preferences' (Aronsson' and' JohanssonJStenman,' 2008,'2010;'Wendner' 2004;' See' also' Graafland,' 2010' and' references' therein).' Their'conclusion'would'be'reversed'when'utility'is'actually'comparisonJconvex.'




































































!We' regress' the' gamble' size' in' the' first' twelve' periods' on' a' number' of' factors'including' OppositeCoin' using' GLS' estimation.' Given' that' gamble' sizes' for'neighbouring' subjects' could' be' correlated' for' other' reasons' than' social'comparison' preferences' (herding,' for' example),' one' needs' to' control' for' the'neighbour’s'gamble'size.'However,'a'simple'OLS'system'of'equations'would'not'work' as' the' independent' variable' for' one' equation' would' show' up' as' a'dependent'variable'in'the'next,'and'viceJversa.53'''Instead,'we'assume'that'the'error'terms'are'spatially'correlated'for'neighboring'subjects:' !! = ! + !" + !!"!! = !! + !" + !!'"
! !!! = Σ =
!! ! 0! !! !0 ! !! ⋯ 0 0 00 0 00 0 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 00 0 00 0 0 ⋯ !
! ! 0! !! !0 ! !!
'
''Furthermore,' we' allow' for' gamble' sizes' to' be' correlated' over' time' for' each'subject,'and'estimate'the'system'of'equation'with'GLS.54''
! !
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
53 Resulting in estimating equations Y1=α+β1Y2+βX1+u1,Y2= α+β1Y1+βX2+u2, etc. To prevent this 
from influencing the results, we control for the correlation between the independent variables through 
the error term.  
54 In particular, we used the R function gls with a linear spatial correlation structure corLin and a 
symmetric time correlation structure corSymm. 







!Dependent'Variable' Gamble'(1)' Gamble'(2)' Gamble'(3)' Gamble'(4)'OppositeCoin' 2.14**'(0.90)' 2.09**'(0.90)' 2.17**'(0.90)' 2.43**'(0.84)'Past'Payoffs'' 0.01'(0.04)' 0.001'(0.03)' ' 'Past'Wins' J0.73'(0.49)' J0.42'(0.47)' ' 'Log'Payoff'Ratio' J0.28'(0.20)' ' J0.35*'(0.18)' J0.36**'(0.18)'Leading'in'Payoffs' J0.09'(0.15)' ' J0.09'(0.15)' J0.12'(0.15)'Log'Win'Ratio' 0.21'(0.22)' ' 0.15'(0.20)' 0.12'(0.20)'Leading'in'Wins' 0.44***'(0.17)' ' 0.38**'(0.16)' 0.39**'(0.16)'Win'Previous'Round' J0.06'(0.10)' J0.05'(0.09)' J0.14*'(0.09)' 'Male' 0.96'(0.72)' 1.02'(0.71)' 0.99'(0.72)' 1.10**'(0.46)'Neighbour'Male' 0.18'(0.71)' 0.22'(0.69)' 0.32'(0.70)' 'Male'*'Neighbour'Male' 0.22'(1.00)' 0.13'(0.98' 0.18'(1.00)' 'Neighbour'Win'Previous'Round' 0.01'(0.08)' J0.02'(0.08)' J0.02'(0.09)' 'Similarity' 0.67'(1.17)' 0.71'(1.16)' 0.69'(1.17)' 'Enjoy'Competition' 2.14*'(1.28)' 2.16*'(1.27)' 2.17*'(1.27)' 2.15*'(1.24)'Dispositional'Envy'' J0.16'(0.85)' J0.18'(0.84)' J0.12'(0.84)' 'Period' 0.01'(0.01)' ' ' 'AIC' 4219.608' 4211.796' 4210.149' 4201.456'
Estimated*with*GLS*with*spatially*and*temporally*correlated*error*terms.*Standard*errors*are*given*










Table!A2.!Determinants!of!gamble! fraction! in!Comparison! treatment!with!
unequal!initial!endowments,!period!13F24.!!
!Dependent'Variable' Gamble'Percentage'(1)' Gamble'Percentage'(2)' Gamble'Percentage'(3)' Gamble'Percentage'(4)''OppositeCoin' 16.7*'(9.0)' 15.6*'(9.0)' 16.1*'(9.0)' 17.2*'(9.3)'Initial'Endowment' J0.79***'(0.22)' J0.80***'(0.22)' J0.89***'(0.21)' J0.88***'(0.22)'Log'Endowment'Ratio' 0.73'(4.8)' 0.90'(4.78)' 1.5'(2.4)' 1.4'(4.8)'Larger'Endowment' J1.73'(1.81)' J1.75'(1.82)' ' J1.6'1.8'Log' Endowment' Ratio*'Larger'Endowment' 4.5'(6.3)' 4.5'(6.4)' ' 4.5'(6.3)'Log'Payoff'Ratio' J3.6*'(1.9)' J3.6*'(1.9)' J3.4*'(1.9)' 'Leading'in'Payoffs' 3.1*'(1.9)' 2.4'(1.8)' 2.6'(1.8)' 'Log'Win'Ratio' 5.4*'(3.0)' 5.9**'(2.9)' 5.2*'(2.8)' 'Leading'in'Wins' J5.7***'(2.1)' J6.0***'' J5.4***'' 'Win'Previous'Round' J1.7'(1.2)' ' ' 'Neighbour'Win'Previous'Round' J0.5'(1.3)' ' ' 'Male' 20.8***'(8.0)' 20.9***'(8.0)' 20.4**'(8.0)' 19.2**'(7.9)'Neighbour'Male' 16.3**'(7.6)' 16.3**'(7.6)' 16.5**'(7.6)' 15.8**'(7.9)'Male'*'Neighbour'Male' J20.0*'(11.3)' J20.0*'(11.4)' J19.1*'(11.3)' J10.7'(10.9)'Similarity' 29.9**'(12.9)' 29.9**'(12.9)' 28.2**'(12.7)' 'Enjoy'Competition' 31.9**'(14.5)' 31.8**'(14.6)' 30.7**'(14.4)' 'Dispositional'Envy'' 7.5'(10.2)' 7.3'(10.3)' ' 'Period' 0.2'(0.2)' 0.16'(0.18)' ' 'AIC' 9811.073' 9813.793' 9821.725' 9847.005'
Estimated*with*GLS*with*spatially*and*temporally*correlated*error*terms.*Standard*errors*are*given*











Figure! A3.! Comparing! the! distributions! of! gambles! in! the! two! treatments.! In! the! No!
Comparison! treatment,! there! is! one! mode! at! gambling! slightly! less! than! half! the!



















Figure! 3! Emotional! rating! on! a! scale! from! F20! (extremely! negative)! to! +20! (extremely!











Proposition!1:!Subjects'will'prefer'negatively'correlated'gambles'iff'their'utility'function'is'comparisonJconvex'( ).'Conversely'subjects'will'prefer'positively'correlated' gambles' iff' their' utility' is' comparisonJconcave' ( ).' Subjects'are'indifferent'between'positively'and'negatively'correlated'gambles'iff'they'do'not' have' social' preferences' ( )' or' their' comparison' utility' is' linear' ().''
Proof:!In'our'setup'given'an'initial'endowment'of'Y,'and'given'a'gross'return'of'R'on'winning'the'gamble,'a'gamble'of'size'g0'will'result'in'payoffs''both'with'0.5'probability.''A'gamble'of'size'g1'by'the'neighbour'will'results'in'payoffs' 'for'neighbour.'The'expected'utility'of'a'gamble'g0'given'a'gamble'g1''by'the'neighbour'is'thus'given'by:'' '(B.1)''However'the'expected'utility'of'the'comparison'term'depends'on'the'correlation'between'outcomes.'Let' 'be'the'expected'utility'of'a'gamble'g0,'given'the'other’s'gamble'g1'with'positively'correlated'outcomes.'That'is:'.'Conversely'let' be'the'expected'utility'of'a'gamble'g0,'given'the'other’s'gamble'g1,''while'choosing'the'opposite'coin'side'as'the'other'player.'Thus'possible'outcomes'are:.''We'will'show'that''iff' ',for' .'''
α > β
0 <α < β
α = β = 0
α = β
x 0∈ {Y − g0,Y + Rg0}
x 1∈ {Y − g1,Y + Rg1}
EU(g0,g1) = E u(x0 )+αmax{x0 − x1, 0}−βmax{x1 − x0, 0} | g0,,g1{ }
EUPOS (g0,g1)
(x0, x1)∈ {(Y − g0,Y − g1), (Y + Rg0,Y + Rg1)} EUNEG (g0,g1)
(x0, x1)∈ {(Y − g0,Y + Rg1), (Y + Rg0,Y − g1)}
EUNEG (g0,g1)> EUPOS (g0,g1) α > β ∀g0,g1





For'the'negatively'correlated'gamble'there'are'two'possible'outcomes:'WinJLoose'and'LooseJWin.'For'the'positively'correlated'gamble'there'are'again'two'possible'outcomes:'LooseJLoose'and'WinJWin.''Since'the'utility'of'the'positively'correlated'gamble'depends'on'whether'you'gamble'more'than'the'other'or'less,'we'will'examine'both'cases'separately.''First'we'write'down'both'expressions'fully:'' '' ' ' ' ' (B.2)''When'g0'<'g1,'inequality'B.2'expands'to:''
' (B.3)'' 'Which'readily'reduces'to' .'''With'g0'>'g1,'the'inequality'B.2'expands'to'''
' (B.4)''
!Which'again'reduces'to' .'''Thus'the 'iff' ',for' .''
EUNEG (g0,g1)> EUPOS (g0,g1)
1
2 u(Y − g0 )+
1




2 β(−g0 + Rg1)>
1
2 u(Y − g0 )+
1




2 β(Rg0 + Rg1)
α > β
1
2 u(Y − g0 )+
1




2 β(−g0 + Rg1)>
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EUNEG (g0,g1)> EUPOS (g0,g1) α > β ∀g0,g1
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There* is* a* large* literature* suggesting* that* comparison* with*
outcomes* of* others* can* affect* preferences.*We* conducted* an*
experiment* to* dissect* whether* this* comparison* centers* on*
one’s* social* rank* with* respect* to* others,* or* on* the* social*
distance*from*other.*The*Social*Rank*Utility*(SRU)*hypothesis*
states* that* individuals* care* about* having* more* than* other*
people,* but* do* not* care* about* how* much* more.* The* Social*
Distance* Utility* (SDU)* hypothesis* states* that* individuals* do*
care* about* how* much* more* than* other’s* they* receive,* but*












1.!Introduction!Usain'Bolt' famously'won'the'2008'Olympic'100m'sprint'with'remarkable'ease.'So'much'so' that'at' the'80'meter'mark'he'stopped'racing,' thrust'his'hands' into'the' air' and' leisurely'paced' towards'his' victory.'Experts' thought'he' could'have'easily'broken'the'world'record'had'he'continued'exerting'himself'for'those'last'couple'of'strides.'However'this'seemed'to'matter'little'to'Bolt,'who'was'content'just'to'beat'the'number'two,'by'whatever'distance.'''Professional'sprinting'is'not'the'only'human'endeavor'where'people'care'about'who' is' ahead' and'who' is' behind.' Indeed' there' is' hardly' any' activity'where' at'least' some' measure' of' competitiveness' enters' the' equation,' economics' not'excepted.'Whether'it'comes'to'your'colleagues'salaries'or'office'size,'the'size'of'your' neighbor’s' house' and' car,' or' even' your' siblings' success' people' tend' to'compare' their'own'outcomes'with'others'and'seem'to'enjoy'having'more' than'others' (see' for' example' Clark' et' al,' 2008).' Therefore' finding' out' how' exactly'people' compare' themselves'with' others' could' have' important' implications' for'optimal'remuneration'policy,'tax'policy'and'others.'''The' question' we' are' interested' in' is:' Do' people' have' preferences' like' Usain'Bolt?55'That' is,' do' people' only' care' about' being' first' or' second,' or' does' the'distance'between'you'and'your'competitors'matter'to'people?'''Both'approaches'are'in'fact'used'the'theoretical'literature'on'social'preferences.'Frank'(1985),'Robson'(1992)'and'Hopkins'and'Kornienko'(2004)'are'examples'of' papers' deploying' a' rank' based' specification.' For' example' in' Frank' (1985)'utility'is'specified'as'''
€ 
Ui =U(xi,yi,R(xi));R(xi) = f (x)dx
x0
xi
∫ ' ' ' ' (1)''
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
55 To be clear: there are many tournament-style situations where Usain Bolt-like behavior makes sense. 
What we are interested in in this paper is whether people have innate rank-based preferences, even in 
the absence of explicit tournament incentives. 





Where'the'utility'of'agent'x'depend'upon'the'consumption'of'a'positional'good'x,'the'consumption'of'a'nonJpositional'good'y,' and' the' rank'of'x' in' the' reference'distribution' F(x).' Thus' in' such' a' specification' only' your' rank' in' the' income'distribution'matters,'not'how'far'below'or'how'far'ahead'you'stand'with'respect'to'others.''Others'like'Rauscher'(1993),'Mui'(1995)'and'Cooper'et'al'(2001)'let'concern'for'relative' consumption' enter' the' model' through' difference' with' average'consumption.' ' In'Rauscher’s' paper'utility'depends'upon'absolute' consumption'and' status,' where' status' is' a' continuous' function' of' own' consumption' and'average'consumption:'''
€ 
Ui = u(xi) + v(si);si = f (xi,
1
N x jj
∑ ) ' ' ' ' ' (2)''In' this' specification' it’s' not' your' rank' in' the' consumption' distribution' that'matters' but' how' far' ahead' or' behind' your' from' the' average' level' of'consumption.''
!
3.!Social!Difference!vs!Social!Rank!In' order' to' test' for' the' existence' of' Social'Rank'Utility' (SRU)'we' focus' on' two'particular' features' of' such' preferences:' discontinuity' and' rankJdependent'indifference.'''Social' Difference' Utility' (SDU)' predicts' continuity' around' the' reference' point.'Being'behind'by'a'little'or'ahead'by'little'should'give'about'the'same'utility.'SRU'however' predicts' a' discontinuous' jump.' Under' SRU' being' first' is'much' better'than'being'second,'even'if'you'beat'the'other'by'just'a'little.'Thus'SRU'posits'that'social' comparison' has' a' kind' of' implied' tournament' structure:' you' get' a' big'(utility)'prize'when'finishing'first'and'nothing'when'you'finish'second.'''RankJdependent'indifference'means'that,'as'long'as'your'rank'in'a'group'is'held'constant,'your'utility'is' independent'of'other’s'outcomes.'Whether'you'are'first'





by' a' landslide' by' the' smallest'margin,' your' satisfaction' from'being' first' is' the'same.'''Suppose' an' individual' gets' an' outcome' x0' and' compares' himself' to' one' other'individual'with'outcome'x1.'With'social'preferences'utility'can'then'by'specified'by'a'two'part'additive'utility'function'given'by'a'standard'(increasing,'concave)'ownJutility'function'u(x0)'over'own'outcomes'and'a'comparisonJutility'function'v(x0Jx1)'over'the'difference'in'outcomes:''' ! !!, !! = ! !! + !(!! − !!)' ' ' (3)'' ' ' ' ' 'The'difference'between'SDU'and'SRU'is'shown'in'the' figure'below.56'With'SDU'the'function'v(x0Jx1)'is'continuous'around'the'reference'point'x1.'With'SRU'there'is' a' jump' in' utility' when' you' make' the' transition' from' x0<x1' to' x0>x1.'Furthermore,'with'SRU'comparison'utility' is' flat'on'either'side'of'the'reference'outcome'x1'due'to'rankJdependent'indifference.''
'
Figure! 2! A! representation! of! Social! Difference! Utility! and! Social! Rank! Utility.! The!
horizontal!axis!represents!the!difference!between!own!and!reference!outcome,!where!x1!
is!the!outcome!of!the!social!referent,!and!x0!is!own!outcome.!The!social!utility!is!given!by!a!
function! v(x0Fx1).! SDU! is! continuous! around! the! reference! point! x0Fx1=0,! whereas! SRU!
predicts!a!discontinuous!jump.!'
''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
56 In this example the SDU function is piecewise linear and weakly convex. This is just an example, the 
function could also be curved and concave. The important thing is that the function is continuous 
around the reference point.  





Our'experimental' setup' is' geared' towards' falsifying' the' two'properties'of' SRU'preferences.'''
! !





4.!Experimental!setup.!The'first'paper'to'look'into'the'question'of'whether'people'exhibit'social'rank'or'social'difference'based'preferences' is'Rohde'and'Rohde' (2009).'Unfortunately,'their'setup'is'not'geared'towards'falsifying'the'discontinuity'and'rank'dependent'flatness' characteristics' and' the' authors' are' unable' to' reject' either' of' these'specifications.'In'this'paper'we'improve'on'their'design.'
!In' the' beginning' of' the' experiment' we' anonymously'match' each' subject' with'another' subject,' the' OTHER.' The' subjects' are' then' asked' to' make' a' series' of'decisions' between' two' options,' with' consequences' for' the' payoff' of' both' the'subject'itself'and'the'OTHER.'''Subjects' are' informed' that' after' the' experiment' one' of' the' questions' will'randomly' be' chosen,' and' the' payoff' of' both' themselves' and' the' OTHER' will'depend'on'their'decision' for' that'question.'This'randomized'payoff'mechanism'prevents' income' effects' and' allows' us' to' use' relatively' high' stakes' questions'(Cubitt'et'al,'1998).''Subjects' were' asked' to' make' twenty' decisions' between' an' option' A' and' an'option'B.'Payoffs' for' self' and'OTHER'could'be'different'between'options.'Both'the'order'of' the'questions'and'the'position'of' the'options'(i.e.' left'or'right)'are'randomized.'Out'of' the' twenty'questions' twelve'were'used' for' the'experiment,'and'eight'were' filler'questions' in'order' to'obfuscate' somewhat' the'purpose'of'the'design.''The' structure' of' our' setup' is' such' that' in' every' instance' there' is' a' choice'between' a' riskJfree' fixed' payoff' A,' and' a' risky' lottery' B.57'There' are' three'different'combinations'of'a'fixed'payoff'A'and'a'risky'lottery'B,'and'we'ask'each'combination'with'four'different'fixed'payoffs' for'the'OTHER.'The'four'different'fixed' payoffs' for' the' OTHER' constitute' a' withinJsubject' design.' In' order' to'distinguish'between'SRU'and'SDU'we'make'use'of'two'distinguishing'features'of'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
57 The value of the lotteries and risk-free options were roughly chosen such that a person with a 
standard CRRA utility function with risk aversion parameter σ=0.5 would be indifferent between the 
two options. 












option!A! is!more!or! less! the! same! for!both! the!MO!and! the!MU!questions,!while! for! SRU!
there!is!a!large!jump.!Similarly!with!SDU!option!A!gives!more!utility!for!the!RPU!than!for!
the!MU!question,!whereas!under!SRU!they!give!the!same!utility.!'To' test' for' the' discontinuity' we' have' a' pair' of' reference' payoffs' Marginally'Under'(MU)'and'Marginally'Over'(MO)'the'fixed'payoff'A.'In'our'case'the'margin'is'fifty'cents.'As'an'example'question'1J4'the'fixed'payoff'option'is'E5,50.'Thus'in'the' MU' question' the' payoff' for' the' OTHER' is' equal' to' E5,00' and' in' the' MO'question'the'payoff'for'the'OTHER'is'equal'to'E6,00.''And'in'order'to'test'for'rank'preserving'indifference'we'have'a'pair'of'reference'payoffs'labeled'Rank'Preserving'Under'(RPU)'and'Rank'Preserving'Over'(RPO).'The'RPU'payoff'is'marginally'above'the'lowest'outcome'of'the'lottery,'and'thus'has' the' same' expected' rank' as' the' MU' payoff.' The' RPO' payoff' is' marginally'below'the'highest'outcome'of'the'lottery,'and'thus'has'the'same'expected'rank'as'the'MO'payoff.'''



















I! 1! €5.50' €0' €20' 50%' €0.50' RPU'
2! €5.50' €0' €20' 50%' €5.00' MU'
3! €5.50' €0' €20' 50%' €6.00' MO'
4! €5.50' €0' €20' 50%' €19.50' RPO'
II! 5! €9.50' €5' €25' 50%' €5.50' RPU'
6! €9.50' €5' €25' 50%' €9.00' MU'
7! €9.50' €5' €25' 50%' €10.00' MO'
8! €9.50' €5' €25' 50%' €24.50' RPO'
III! 9! €7.50' €0' €18' 66%' €0.50' RPU'
10! €7.50' €0' €18' 66%' €7.00' MU'
11! €7.50' €0' €18' 66%' €8.00' MO'
12! €7.50' €0' €18' 66%' €17.50' RPO''
5.!Predictions!'
Prediction! 1:' Subjects*with* SRU*preferences* are*more* likely* to* choose* the* risky*
lottery*option*B*in*the*MO*treatment*than*in*the*MU*treatment.*'To'test'for'the'flatness'of'utility'on'either'side'of'the'reference'point'we'have'a'Rank'Preserving'Under'(RPU)'and'a'Rank'Preserving'Over'(RPO)'payoff'for'the'other.' The' reason' they' are' called' rank' preserving' is' that' the' expected' rank' of'both'options,' that' is' the'probability'of'getting'a'higher'payoff,'are'the'same'for'both'the'MO'(MU)'and'the'RPO'(RPU)'questions.'''Consider'the' first' four'questions'with'a'choice'between'a' fixed'payoff'of'€5,50'(option'A)'or'a'lottery'with'a'50%'chance'of'winning'€20,J'and'a'50%'chance'of'winning'€0,J'(option'B).'With'the'MO'question'the'payoff'for'OTHER'is'equal'to'





€6,J' and' thus' the' probability' of' having' higher' payoff' than' OTHER' is' 0%' for'option'A'and'50%'for'option'B.'Now'look'at'the'RPO'treatment'where'the'OTHER'will' receive'a'payoff'of'€19,50.'Again' the'probability'of'having'a'higher'payoff'than'OTHER' is' 0%' for' option' A' and' 50%' for' option' B.' This' is'what'we'mean'when'we'say'that'the'expected'ranks'are'the'same'for'both'questions.'The'same'reasoning'goes'for'the'MU'and'RPU'treatments.'''Since'an'individual'with'SRU'preferences'only'cares'about'rank,'she'should'not'change'choices'between'treatment'MO'and'RPO,'or'between'MU'and'RPU.''
Prediction!2:'Subjects*with*SRU*preferences*should*not*change*decisions*between*
MO*and*RPO*treatments*and*between*MU*and*RPU*treatments.''In'summary'we'would'reject'SDU'when'we'find'a'significant'difference'between'MO'and'MU'but'none'between'RPO'and'MO'or'RPU'and'MU.'We'would'reject'SRU'when' we' find' no' significant' difference' between' MO' and' MU,' but' do' find'differences'between'RPO'and'MO'or'RPU'and'MU.''
5.!Results.!On' June' 21,' 22' and' 23' 2010' five' experimental' sessions'were' deployed' at' the'Einaudi'Institute'for'Economics'and'Finance'(EIEF)'in'Rome,'Italy.''Subjects'were'recruited'with'emails'and'posters'on'universities'in'Rome,'and'via'the'website'of'EIEF.'Over'all'five'sessions'64'subjects'showed'up.'''Participants'were'given'some'minutes' to'read' the' instructions,'after'which' the'experimenter' went' through' the' instructions' line' by' line' and' answered' any'remaining'questions.'Subjects'were'paid'a'showJup'free'of'E5,J'plus'the'outcome'of'one'of'the'20'decisions,'selected'at'random'at'the'end'of'the'experiment.''Subjects' were' seated' behind' computer' screens' and' were' unable' to' see' the'screens'of'other'participants.'The'experimental'setup'was'programmed'with'the'experimental'software'zJTree'(Fischbacher,'2007).'
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Result! 1.! The* propensity* to* choose* the* risky* lottery* option* is* increasing* in* the*
payoff*of*the*OTHER.*'As' can' be' seen' in' Table' 3,' the' propensity' to' choose' the' risky' lottery' B' is'increasing' in' the'payoff'of' the'OTHER.58'When'the'payoff'of' the'OTHER' is'very'low' (RPU)' only' 40%' of' subject' choose' the' lottery,' whereas' 57%' choose' the'lottery' when' the' payoff' to' the' other' is' high' (RPO).59'The' MU' and' the' MO'questions'fall' in'between.'A'probit'regression'confirms'this'result'as'significant'(see'Appendix).''
Table!3.!Percentage!choosing!risky!lottery!by!questions!type.! !Question'Type' Percentage'of'subjects'that'choose'risky'lottery'B'RPU' 40%'MU' 45%'MO' 43%'RPO' 57%''A'probit'regression'shown'in'table'4'confirms'this'result'as'significant.'
Table!4!Probability!of!Choosing!Lottery!increasing!with!OTHER’s!payoff.!Dependent'Variable' Chose'lottery'B'(1)' Chose'Lottery'B'(2)' Chose'Lottery'B'(3)'OtherFraction' 0.57***'(0.10)' 0.59***'(0.10)' 0.59***'(0.10)'Male' ' 0.44***'(0.17)' 0.43***'(0.16)'Age' ' ' 0.02*'(0.01)'Pseudo'R2' 0.02' 0.04' 0.04'
!
Estimated*with*a*probit*regression,*with*standard*errors*clustered*on*subject.*Standard*errors*are*
given* in*parentheses.*Numbers*with***are*significant*at* the*108percent* level.*Numbers*with****are*
significant*at*the*58percent*level.*Numbers*with*****are*significant*at*the*18percent*level.*Number*of*
observations:*832.*Number*of*subjects:*64.*''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
58 Interestingly, this goes against the results of Linde and Sonnemans (2009), who found higher risk 
taking in a social gain treatment (similar to our RPU) than in a social loss treatment (similar to our 
RPO). 
59 This difference between the RPU and RPO treatments is highly significant: Wilcoxon rank sum test: 
W = 28832, p-value = 0.0003. 







B*when*the*differences*are*small.'''SRU'preferences'would'predict'a'higher'propensity'to'choose'the' lottery' in'the'MO' questions' than' in' the' MU' questions.' In' fact,' the' fraction' of' subject' that'choose' the' lottery' is' even' slightly' lower' in' the' MO' (43%)' than' in' the' MU'treatment' (45%).' ' This' difference' however' is' not' statistically' significant.'(Wilcoxon'test,'p=0.61)''
Result! 3." " Keeping* expected* rank* for* both* options* constant,* the* propensity* to*
choose*the*lottery*option*B*is*not*independent*of*the*payoff*of*the*OTHER.'''The' fraction' of' subjects' that' choose' the' lottery' in' the' RPO' question' (57%)' is'higher' than' in' the' MO' treatment' (43%).' Furthermore' this' difference' is'significant' (Wilcoxon' test,' p=' 0.002).' The' difference' between' the' fraction' of'subjects' that' chose' the' lottery' in' the' RPU' questions' (40%)' and' in' the' MU'questions'(45%)'is'smaller'and'indeed'not'significant'(Wilcoxon'rank'sum'test,'W='19392,'p='0.30).'
!
! !





7.!Discussion!and!conclusion!In'our'experiment'we'find'no'evidence'that'subjects'are'motivated'by'a'concern'for' rank'when'making'a'decision'on' risky'prospects.'We'do' find'evidence' that'the'height'of'other’s'payoffs'matters,'and'the'higher'the'other’s'payoff,'the'more'willing'people'are'to'take'risky'gambles.'What' this' seems' to' point' to' is' that' there' are' two' different' pathways' through'which' social' comparison' affects' us.' On' the' one' hand,'we' use' the' outcomes' of'others'as'a'reference'to'evaluate'our'own'outcomes.'As'suggested'by'Corricelli'and'Rustichini'(2009)'emotions'such'as'regret'and'envy'could'aid'us'in'learning'about' the' optimality' of' our' own' behaviour.' Small' differences' however' would'provide'little'information.''On'the'other'hand'we'strive'for'social'recognition'and'we'like'to'be'seen'to'by'others'to'be'outdoing'our'peers,'maybe'even'if'by'small'margins.'However'this'pathway' is'only'relevant'when'others'can'observe'our'outcomes.'Conducting'a'similar'experiment'where'payments'are'rewarded' in'public' to'both'subjects'at'the'same'time'may'yield'different'results.'' '













































Dijk, Oege (2012), Keeping up with the Medici! Three essays on social comparison, consumption and risk 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/39600
